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ABSTRACT: Due to an emerging Brazilian doctrine of environ-
mental liability, lenders now face the prospect of lawsuits that
seek remediation of, or compensation for, environmental
damages resulting from their borrowers' activities. Unprece-
dented judicial decisions (based on a strict, joint and several
environmental liability for lenders) broad standing, and on-
going initiatives of the government portray financial
institutions as the best target to pursue environmental protec-
tion in the country. That scenario, however, may represent a
detour from the imperative improving the functionality of the
public administration. This article examines how legal actors
are shaping Brazil's environmental law enforcement and the
extent to which it affects financial institutions, and also the
grounds where the lender environmental liability scheme
applied in the United States was tailored to sound banking
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practices. This article concludes that placing lenders as substi-
tutes for the public administration should not be misunder-
stood as consistent with a modern business model based on
accountability, and will impose political and economic costs on
the sustainable development of the country. This article also
suggests practices that might be employed to enhance deals in
Brazil, but in a safer manner for lenders.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil's highest court for all federal matters except consti-
tutional appeals recently declared that lenders aware of environ-
mental damages created by their borrowers should bear strict, joint
and several liability for such damage. Brazil's National Environ-
mental Policy law provides the basis for this liability, requiring only
causation and injury to be established before a court in order to
constitute a tort claim sufficient to impose liability upon a direct or
even an indirect polluter. Lenders are commonly identified as within
the category of indirect polluters. Moreover, Brazil's Federal Consti-
tution explicitly requires balancing economic growth and environ-
mental protection, which not only drives both government and
society towards sustainable development, but arguably also supports
the court's view of lender environmental liability.
Lenders now face the prospect of lawsuits by both the Public
Ministry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek
remediation of, or compensation for, environmental damages
resulting from their borrowers' activities.1
* Bianca Chilinque Zambdo Da Silva has been admitted to practice law in Brazil
since 2004. A graduate in law of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro and in
knowledge management of the Escuela de Organizaci6n Industrial (Madrid), she
earned her LL.M degree in May 2010 from the UCLA School of Law. She has
worked with leading Brazilian banks and taught at the Universidade Estadual do Rio
de Janeiro. She is currently a consultant at the Inter-American Development Bank in
Washington, DC. The opinions expressed here are the author's personal views, and
do not necessarily reflect the position of any organization with which she has or has
had an affiliation. The author thanks Professor Patrick Del Duca and the participants
of the Spring 2010 class on International Finance at the UCLA Law School for
valuable comments on the manuscript. Extended thanks to John Wilson, Foreign &
V. is
Brazil's Lender Environmental Liability
The emerging Brazilian doctrine of environmental lender
liability does not on its face fully reveal the dynamic behind it.
Brazil's Ministry of the Environment appears to endorse the belief
that regulating the terms of financing is a replacement for the instru-
ments of environmental command-and-control policies. If not
properly managed, this belief risks to establish lender liability as a
weak substitute for a system of environmental impact assessment
and environmental permitting conducted by the public administra-
tion.
The approach in the United States to environmental lender
liability commenced in a similarly scary way for lenders, but matured
into a measured tool to incentivize proper lender behavior. The
foundation and development of this extended liability for lenders in
the United States sheds important light on transactions and
enforcement actions that are to come in Brazil, especially for financial
institutions that have aggressive internal policies of environmental
assessment and due diligence investigation.
The "best practices" lending procedures of export credit
agencies (ECAs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs), whose
procedures have been extended to commercial banks through their
widespread adoption of the Equator Principles, exacerbate the
likelihood of such a lender's liability under Brazilian law. This is a
perverse result because these lending practices, if fully and diligently
applied, are highly effective instruments to support lenders' risk
management and to mitigate the likelihood of environmental damag-
ing activities.
Section II presents unprecedented judicial decisions and
ongoing initiatives of key actors in Brazil that illustrate the reason
why environmental issues present a significant legal risk to lending
in Brazil, particularly to lending in support of infrastructure
development on a project financing basis. This study also analyzes
International Law Librarian at the UCLA Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library, for
generous assistance. Thanks are also due to Mr. Marcelo Battisti for helpful
discussions.
1 "Public Ministry" is a literal translation of "Minist~rio Poblico," Brazil's
independent enforcement body comprised of its prosecutors.
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Brazil's legal and regulatory framework to demonstrate that environ-
mental exposure for lenders involves risks beyond those conven-
tionally considered in legal risk management. Section III explores
lessons to be drawn from the definition and use of "owner and
operator" liability, which has been a crucial factor in the develop-
ment of lender environmental liability in the United States, and
compares the state of the law in the United States and Brazil. Section
IV reviews the environmental diligence practices of the MDBs and
ECAs, as well as of the Equator Principles. It explores how these
practices can aggravate lender liability under the emerging law in
Brazil, and also how they might be employed to enhance deals in
Brazil, but in a safer way for lenders.
II. BRAZIL'S ALARMING ENVIRONMENTAL
SCENARIO FOR LENDERS
Unprecedented judicial decisions and ongoing initiatives of
key actors in Brazil raise the prospect that lenders may also be liable
for environmental damages created by their borrowers. As a result,
environmental risks faced by lenders include not only those that
would impede repayment of the debt or damage the lender's
reputation. Especially in view of the number and size of infrastruc-
ture projects anticipated in Brazil in the next few years, 2 these
developments in Brazil's environmental law merit the attention of
lenders.
2 See John Rumsey, Do Brazil's Infrastructure Plans Have a Sporting Chance?,
PROJECT FIN. MAG., Dec. 16, 2009, at Features. In addition to the 2014 World Cup
and the 2016 Rio Olympics, the excitement about infrastructure opportunities in
Brazil is becoming widespread. The country now enjoys a "large market, good
assets, and stable economy." The scenario looks promising. "In five years, Brazilian
infrastructure investments will be running at $92 billion per year, compared to $61
billion in 2008 and just $30 billion in 2003."). Id.
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A. Recent Judicial Decisions and the Brazilian Environmental Law
In 2009, the Superior Court of Justice, Brazil's highest federal
court of appeals on non-constitutional matters, 3 issued alarming
decisions in lawsuits related to environmental damage. These deci-
sions imply that lenders can be considered indirect polluters under a
strict, joint and several liability scheme, even before foreclosure.
A decision published in December 2009,4 involving the Feder-
al Public Ministry and a hardware manufacturer regarding environ-
mental damages in a mangrove area, would not have deserved much
attention by lenders had not the Superior Court of Justice 5 also
broadly analyzed what additional entities could be liable for the
environmental damages, without regard to culpability. Even though
no financial institution has been part of a suit involving a sensitive
coastal ecosystem, this higher court, through a unanimous decision,
sent an alarming message, stating that:
For the purpose of determination of the proximate cause
in environmental damage cases, one who commits [the
act] shall be equated with one who does nothing when he
or she should act, who allows it to happen, who does
not care what is being done, who is financing so that it
can be done, and who benefits when others act.6
3 CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 15, 1988, art. 105 (Braz.).
4 S.T.J.-T2, REsp 650728, Relator: Min. Benjamin Herman, 23.10.2007, REVISTA DO
SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIQA [R.S.T.J.], 02.12.2009 (Braz.)
5 The Superior Court of Justice is composed of three sections; specialized
respectively in (i) public, (ii) private, and (iii) criminal and social security laws.
Turmas de Julgamento, SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIQA, http://www.stj.gov.
br/portalstj/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area-432 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). This
case was judged by the Second Group of the First Section.
6 S.T.J.-T2, REsp 650728, Relator: Min. Benjamin Herman, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
02.12.2009 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "Para o fim de apuraqdo do
nexo de causalidade no dano ambiental, equiparam-se quem faz, quem ndo faz
quando deveria fazer, quem deixa fazer, quem ndo se importa que faqam, quem
financia para que faqam, e quem se beneficia quando outros fazem."). All Brazilian
cases cited in this article can be retrieved by case number at http://www.stj.jus.br.
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Another 2009 pronouncement of the same Court speaks more
directly to lenders' liability for environmental damages created by
their borrowers. In this case, the Federal Public Ministry sued the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), among others, for environ-
mental damages as consequence of a borrower's mining activities.
The Superior Court of Justice, in a decision made by a single Justice,7
implied that banks can limit liability by establishing diligent inquiry,
but confirmed liability where banks disbursed funds with knowledge
of the environmental concern. The Court stated:
Regarding BNDES, the simple fact that it is the financial
institution responsible for financing the mining activi-
ties .... at a first analysis, does not establish that it can
be a defendant in the case. However, if there is evidence
that this government-owned corporation [BNDES] was
even aware of serious and severe environmental harm
[and] ... has released intermediate or final disburse-
ments to the mining project . . .in this case, [BNDES]
shall be under a joint and several liability for damages.8
The scope of this liability is found in the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,9 where article 14, paragraph I states:
[T]he polluter is required, regardless offault, to compensate
or repair damage caused to the environment or to third
7 The opinion of the court occurred under a monocratic decision decision taken by
a single judge - because the appellant did not satisfy all the requirements to have the
case analyzed by a panel.
8 S.T.J., REsp 995321, Realtor: Min. Benedito Gonqalves, 15.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
15.12.2009 (Braz.) (original wording: "Quanto ao BNDES, o simples fato de ser ele
a instituiqdo financeira incumbida de financiar a atividade mineradora . ..em
principio, por si s6, nao o legitima para figurar no p6lo passivo da demanda. Toda-
via, se vier a ficar comprovado ... que a referida empresa pfblica, mesmo ciente da
ocorrencia dos danos ambientais que se mostram s~rios e graves... houver liberado
parcelas intermedidrias ou finais dos recursos para o projeto de exploraqao minerdria
.... ai, sim, caber-lhe-i responder solidariamente corn as demais entidades-r~s pelos
danos .... ).
9 Lei No. 6938, de 31 Agosto de 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
02.09.1981 (Braz.).
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parties as a result of the polluter's activities. The Federal
and State prosecutors have standing to initiate civil or
criminal action to determine liability for environmental
damage against polluters.10
The National Environmental Policy Act in fact imposes strict
liability on behalf of the polluter by paying for the environmental
harm or paying compensatory damages. Its imposition of liability
satisfies conventional definitions of strict liability, namely, liability
that "does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but
that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe."11 Moreover, suing a polluter under the Brazilian tort system
requires no demonstration of recklessness or malpractice. The only
elements required to be established are causation and injury.
According to another 2009 case by the Superior Court of
Justice, in which the Public Ministry of the State of Gois brought suit
against a major electric utility company, among others, for environ-
mental damages as a result of the construction of a hydropower
plant, "[1]iability for environmental damage is under a strict liability
scheme and, as such, does not require proof of culpability, but only
the finding of a nexus between injury and causation."' 2 This decision
was unanimous.
For the purposes of Brazilian law, a polluter is "the person or
entity, whether government-owned or not, directly or indirectly
responsible for the activity that causes environmental degradation." 13
'o Id. (emphasis added) (origional wording: "[t] o poluidor obrigado, inde-
pendentemente da existencia de culpa, a indenizar ou reparar os danos causados ao
meio ambiente e a terceiros, afetados por sua atividade. 0 Ministdrio Publico da
Uniao e dos Estados terA [sic] legitimidade para propor aqao de responsabilidade
civil e criminal, por danos causados ao meio ambiente.").
"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 998 (9th ed. 2004).
S.T.J., REsp 1056540, Realtor: Min. Eliana Calmon, 16.05.2008, R.S.T.J.,
14.09.2009 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "[a] responsabilidade por
danos ambientais 6 objetiva e, como tal, n~o exige a comprovaqdo de culpa, bastando
a constataqao do dano e do nexo de causalidade.").
13 Lei No. 6.938, 31 de Agosto de 1981, D.O.U. 02.09.1981 (Braz.) (emphasis
added) (original wording: "[E]ntende-se por... poluidor, a pessoa fisica ou juridica,
2010
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Therefore, the Brazilian federal environmental statute imposes not
only a strict liability scheme, but also a joint and several liability
regime, meaning that "[1]iability . . .may be apportioned either
among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of
a group, at the adversary's discretion."14
Hence, there are two substantial features to be considered.
First, the "imposition of this liability.., need not to be 'fingerprinted'
or linked directly back to a particular party to be responsible for
[damages]."15 Second, the party who brings a civil suit has the
freedom (or power) to decide which of the direct and indirect pollu-
ters to pursue for damages. Defendants, however, maintain the right
to sue responsible parties for contribution (if both are direct
polluters) or for recovery (if the defendant is an indirect polluter). As
confirmed by the Superior Court of Justice in the case mentioned
above: "[t]he joint and several liability arises from the National
Environmental Policy Act, article 3(IV) and article 14, paragraph 1."16
The higher courts of Brazil's states (Tribunais de Justi~a dos
Estados) concur with the strict, joint and several nature of environ-
mental liability as declared by the Superior Court of Justice.1 7 For
instance, in a case presented before the court of appeals of the state of
Rio Grande do Sul,18 where the improper use of fire to clear native
vegetation resulted in grave environmental damage, the judges
de direito publico ou privado, responsdtvel, direta ou indiretamente, por atividade
causadora de degradaqo ambiental.").
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 997.
15 See DANIEL A. FABER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
891 (2010).
16 S.T.J., REsp 1056540, Realtor: Min. Eliana Calmon, 16.05.2008, R.S.T.J.,
14.09.2009 (Braz.) (original wording: "A solidariedade nessa hip6tese decorre da
dicqao dos arts. 30, inc. IV, e 14, § 1', da Lei 6.398/1981 (Lei da Politica Nacional
do Meio Ambiente).").
17 In addition to Federal Statutes, courts have jurisdiction to decide environmental
harms with effects that are limited to the territory of the state. The analysis here
focuses on the federal law, even though the states and municipalities also have
power to protect the environment. C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 23 (Braz.). Federal
legislation also contemplates criminal sanctions relative to environmental protection,
which is not addressed here.
'8 The state courts of Rio Grande do Sul are nationally recognized for their cutting-
edge, modern and tailored decisions.
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unanimously decided that the plaintiff could freely decide which
defendant to target for environmental remediation or compensation
purposes. The decision, indeed, states that the selection of defendants
is at the Public Ministry's discretion and any request for joinder of
parties is not acceptable. The defendant could not even raise the issue
of basis for apportionment, since under Brazilian law a single
defendant can be held strictly, jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm. In the view of Brazilian law, the defendant's right to sue
responsible parties for contribution can only be sought in a different
action, where the defendant held liable can assert culpability and
legal theories of cost allocation. The judge in charge of the report
supported his decision, stating:
[I]n cases where the law imposes strict liability, as in
matters related to the environment ... the fault of a
third party will never enter into the discussion in the
same action ... because the secondary claim (based on
culpability) does not concern in the solution of the main
claim (based on strict liability). 19
Lenders can be considered indirect polluters because the only
legal elements required to establish damages are injury and causa-
tion. On interpretation of this standard is that causation would be
established when the result would not have occurred without the
party's conduct or if the defendant's conduct is an important or
significant contributor to the injuries. Because credit is an essential
prerequisite to the realization of large initiatives, a lender would fall
within this standard.
9 T.J.R.S, Ap. Civ. No. 70032034183, Relator: Des. Carlos Roberto Lofego Canibal,
16.12.2009, Didrio da Justiga do Rio Grande do Sul [D.J.R.S.], 8.2.2010 (Braz.)
(quoting HUGO NIGRO MAZZILI, A DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM JUiZO, 260
(18th ed. 2005)) (original wording: "No caso, por~m, em que a lei imponha
responsabilidade objetiva, como em mat~ria relativa ao meio ambiente . .. nao se
admitird a discussao da culpa de terceiro, nos mesmos autos da agao . . . porque a
lide secundria (fundada na culpa) ndo interessa d soluqdo da lide principal (fundada
na responsabilidade objetiva).").
2010
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Furthermore, unlike cases of corporate loans, in project
finance deals, the connection between the lender and the activity that
causes harm is much more substantial, as illustrated by the terms of
the international Basel II Framework 20 for use by national bank
regulators in assessing the capital adequacy of regulated financial
institutions:
Project finance (PF) is a method of funding in which the
lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a
single project, both as the source of repayment and as
security for the exposure .... In such transactions, the
lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively out of
the money generated by the contracts for the facility's
output, such as the electricity sold by a power plant. The
borrower is usually an SPE [Special Purpose Entity] that
is not permitted to perform any function other than
developing, owning, and operating the installation. The
consequence is that repayment depends primarily on the
project's cash flow and on the collateral value of the
project's assets .... 21
A further foundation of the emerging doctrine of environ-
mental lender liability in Brazil arises from Brazil's Constitution. The
Brazilian Constitution provides that both "[tihe government and the
community have the duty to defend and preserve [the ecologically
balanced environment] for present and future generations." 22 Since
lenders are members of the community, they have also the duty to
20 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 2, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs 111.pdf ("In addition, the Revised Framework [Basel 11] is intended
to promote a more forward-looking approach to capital supervision, one that
encourages banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in the future, and to
develop or improve their ability to manage those risks.").
22 Id. 221-222, at 49.
21 C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 225 (Braz.) (original wording: "impondo-se ao poder
pblico e i coletividade o dever de defend-1o e preserv6i- lo para as presentes e
futuras geraq6es.").
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protect the environment. For that reason, there is a hidden environ-
mental risk to lenders that goes beyond that presented by a
traditional due-diligence analyses.
This broad environmental regime threatens lenders. Addi-
tionally, there is a risk associated with foreclosed collateral. A
financial institution can be called, for example, to remediate conta-
mination of a foreclosed property, a demand that can exceed the
amount of the loan. In some instances, lack of causation might be a
defense. For example, the credit may not have been directed to the
property concerned or to activities related to the harm. But, even in
these cases, the duty to repair the environment would be maintained.
This understanding is based on the propter rem theory, according to
which the responsibility to repair would arise from the legal link
between the owner of the property and the property itself. Therefore,
propter rem obligations adhere to the title of the property and are
automatically transferred to the future owners. In a decision pub-
lished in November 2009 by the Superior Court of Justice, where the
plaintiff was the State Public Ministry of Sdo Paulo, the defendant, a
sugarcane company, was found liable for environmental damages
simply because it had acquired a property already damaged by
previous owners. 23 The prior owners had completely deforested the
property, disrespecting the legal reserve and permanent preservation
areas requirements applicable to Brazilian forests.24 The federal
23 S.T.J., REsp 948921, Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
11.11.2009 (Braz.).
24 The "legal reserve" (reserva legal) and "permanent preservation area" (area de
preserva(0o permanente - APP) are mechanisms that implement the constitutional
duty to maintain property with its social and ecological functions, so as to guaranty
the sustainable use of natural resources and, among other goals, geological stability
and human welfare. For example, in the region where the case at issue was brought,
twenty percent of a property's area is subject to the reservation that the vegetation
cannot be removed. In the Amazon ecosystem, this percentage reaches eighty
percent of a property's area. In addition to this "legal reserve" requirement, there is a
further requirement to conserve "permanent preservation area." Land subject to
permanent preservations is determined by geography, for example, sensitive areas
such as riverbanks. To illustrate, a river up to ten meters in breadth implies thirty
meters of permanent preservation area along each of its banks. Only in limited
2010
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Superior Court of Justice, through its specialized Section on Public
Law, unanimously decided that the sugarcane company was liable,
without regard to culpability or causal connection of the defendant's
conduct. The Court stated:
It is not proper to speak about culpability or proximate
cause as determinative of the duty to restore native
vegetation . . . . As the hypothesis is of a propter rem
obligation, it is unreasonable to question who caused
the environmental harm in casu, whether it was the
current or previous owner, or the culpability of those
who did or did not damage the environment.25
In its defense, the sugarcane company assured that the harm
happened, not only before the transference of the property's title, but
in 1983 when the law regulating the issue was not yet in force, and
that the conduct was protected as an act that the law had not then
condemned as illegal. The Superior Court of Justice rejected this
defense with the observation that the innovation brought by the 1989
regulation was not on the creation of the duty to reserve a percentage
of the property, but about the duty to make record of it in a public
registry through a notary. This court emphasized the need for care to
avoid confusion between the creation of the legal duty to preserve the
area and the publicity of its condition to third parties.26
instances, such as when the sum of the "permanent preservation area" and the "legal
reserve" reaches at least fifty percent of rural property outside the so-called "Legal
Amazon," can "permanent preservation areas" be considered as comprising of part
of the "legal reserve." Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, D.O.U. de
16.09.1965 (Braz.).
25 S.T.J., REsp 948921, Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
11.11.2009 (Braz.) (original wording: "Descabe falar em culpa ou nexo causal, como
fatores determinantes do dever de recuperar a vegetagAo nativa . . . . Sendo a
hip6tese de obrigaqfo propter rem, desarrazoado perquirir quem causou o dano
ambiental in casu, se o atual proprietfirio ou os anteriores, ou a culpabilidade de
quem o fez ou deixou de fazer.").
26 Id. ("A inovaqdo que trouxe nao foi quanto d* instituiqao da obrigagao de conservar
a Reserva Legal, mas simplesmente de averbi-la no registro imobilidrio. Hd, aqui, de
ter cuidado para nao confundir a criagdo de dever legal corn a posterior disciplina,
pelo legislador, de sua publicidade perante terceiros.").
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Lenders must be aware of the consequences of this law in at
least two crucial ways. First, notwithstanding the provision of a legal
duty to register the "legal reserve" before a notary, the effectiveness
of this rule is being constantly postponed. In December 2009,27 the
due date was once again extended to June 11, 2011 as a consequence
of the increased demands on already overwhelmed environmental
agencies -which have the duty initially to approve the localization of
the "legal reserve" area-and the strong agribusiness lobby in
Brazil's Congress-which is working on proposed legislation to up-
date Brazil's Forestry Code.28 As a result, the definition of appro-
priate collateral is even more complex due to uncertainties regarding
the actual value of the property. There is no reliable source to find
out what is the percentage of the land that can be economically
exploited. For instance, as of November 2009, according to the
Brazilian National Confederation of Agriculture (Confederapio Nacion-
al da Agricultura - CNA), less than ten percent of properties subject to
the "legal reserve" are now registered before a notary. The president
of this confederation points out that the majority of rural producers
do not register the "legal reserve" because they simply do not have it
preserved. 29 Second, after a foreclosure, the lender can be surprised
by a legal duty to not only assume the cost of restoring the vege-
tation, but also to accomplish the public registration. In fact, an
investigation by the leading Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sdo Paulo
demonstrated that the Superior Court of Justice has clearly changed
its approach on deforestation. Ten years ago, the court did not
require owners to restore the "legal reserve." In an article published
in November 2009, that newspaper also observed that while Brazil's
Federal Government delays penalties for irregular properties, the
27 Decreto No. 7.029, de 10 de Dezembro de 2009, D.O.U. de 11.12.2009 (Braz.).
28 See, e.g., Projeto de Lei No. 6.424/2005, de 14 de Dezembro de 2005 (Braz.),
available at http://wiv camara.gov. brlsileglintegras/365049.pdf
29 See Marta Salomon, Mais de 90% dos proprietarios rurais ndo registram reserve
legal [Over 90% of Landowners Don't Register the Legal Reserve], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO (Nov. 30, 2009), http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ambiente/ultl0007
u659452.shtml.
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Superior Court of Justice had begun to mandate the environmental
restoration.30
The manner in which the Superior Court of Justice decided to
fully implement this law is an important instrument to address
unsustainable land-use practices and deforestation, which are the
most serious Brazilian contributions to global warming. Brazil is
ranked the eighth country in total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.31
Indeed, judge Herman Benjamin of the Superior Court of Justice, who
has built his distinguished legal career working mainly with environ-
mental law,32 has demonstrated his concern with climate change
related cases, such as in the one previously presented in this study
regarding a mangrove forest. In this case, he states:
Everyone has the duty, whether they are property own-
ers or not, to guard the preservation of mangroves, a
necessity even greater in times of climate change and
the rising of sea levels. The destruction of mangroves for
direct economic use, under the constant encouragement
of easy money and short-term benefits . . . [of] specula-
30 See Marta Salomon, Justiqa ignora adiamento de Lula e pune desmatadores de
reserva legal [Justice Ignores President Lula's Postponment and Punishes Loggers
of the Legal Reserve], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO (Nov. 30, 2009) http://wwwl.
folha.uol.com.br/folha/ambiente/ult 10007u659447.shtml.
31 CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 135 (2009).
32 Professor Ant6nio Herman de Vasconcellos e Benjamin was appointed as justice
of the Superior Court of Justice in 2006. He became one of the nine justices of the
Superior Court of Justice responsible for public law decisions. He is the founder and
co-editor in chief of the Brazilian Environmental Law Journal, the only regular
environmental law review in Latin America. He teaches Environmental Law and
Products Liability in both Brazil and the United States, including the last 15 years as
a regular visiting professor of environmental law at the University of Texas at
Austin. He also taught at the University of Illinois from 1999 to 2001. Professor
Benjamin has been a member of the UN Legal Experts Committee on Crimes against
the Environment and the IUCN Environmental Law Commission. He is the founder
and a director of Law for a Green Planet Institute, a leading Brazilian environmental
law organization. Antonio Herman de Vasconcellos e Benjamin, SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIQA, http://www.stj.jus.br/web/verCurriculoMinistro?cod
matriculamin-0001184&imln (last visited Jan. 28, 2011); see also Seminar Speaker
Information, Antonio Herman Benjamin, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, available at
http :1www. iadb. org/biz/agenda/Benjamin.pdf
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tive real state... feature[s] as serious harm to an ecolo-
gically balanced environment and to the welfare of the
community, which conduct shall be promptly and
intensely restrained and sanctioned by the Government
and the Judiciary.3
Adding this climate change concern to the reasoning of
courts, it is certainly foreseeable that the following statement placed
in the decision of the above sugarcane case will be an important
source for future decisions on deforestation:
First, ownership is a source of rights and duties. Second,
those who acquire a property [already] illegally defor-
ested, or with other irregularities before the environ-
mental law protection, receive it not only with its posi-
tive attributes and betterments, but also with the envi-
ronmental burdens, including the duty to recover the
native vegetation of the [liegal [rieserve and the
[p]ermanent [p]reservation [a]rea. 34
33 S.T.J.-T2, REsp 650728, Realtor: Min. Benjamin Herman, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
02.12.2009 (Braz.) (original wording: "E dever de todos, proprietdrios ou nao, zelar
pela preservaq~o dos manguezais, necessidade cada vez maior, sobretudo em 6poca
de mudanqas climdticas e aumento do nivel do mar. Destruf-los para uso econ6mico
direto, sob o permanente incentivo do lucro fdcil e de beneficios de curto prazo...
[de] especulaqao imobilidria . . . caracterizam ofensa grave ao meio ambiente
ecologicamente equilibrado e ao bem-estar da coletividade, comportamento que deve
ser pronta e energicamente coibido e apenado pela Administrago e pelo
Judicidrio.").
34 S.T.J.-T2, REsp 948921, Min. Herman Benjamin, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
11.11.2009 (Braz.) (original wording: "Primeiro, a propriedade 6 fonte de direitos, e
tamb~m de deveres. Segundo, quem adquire im6vel desmatado ilegalmente, ou com
irregularidades perante a legislaq~o de proteqdo do meio ambiente, recebe-o ndo s6
com seus atributos positivos e benfeitorias, como tamb~m com os 6nus ambientais
que sobre ele incidam, inclusive o dever de recuperar a vegetaqao nativa da Reserva
Legal e das Areas de PreservaqAo Permanente.").
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Notably, the Latin risk theory ubi emolumentum ibi onus35 has
influenced the development of the Brazilian environmental liability.
Under this theory, the one who benefits from the environmental
resource should also bear the related risk. Moreover, since in general
environmental harm is "indivisible," Brazilian courts have recog-
nized that joint and several liability is a better answer to address the
environmental goals set by Article 225 of Brazil's Federal
Constitution, which is the heart of the Brazilian environmental
liability:
Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced envi-
ronment, which is a public good for people's use and is
essential for a healthy quality of life, and both the govern-
ment and the community have the duty to defend and
preserve it for present and future generations .... Con-
duct and activities considered harmful to the environ-
ment shall subject the violators, be they individuals or
legal entities, to criminal and administrative penalties,
without prejudice to the obligation to repair the harm.36
Besides setting forth a mandate to the legislature to take
action, the Federal Constitution established the defense of the
environment as a fundamental social right with a constitutional claim
for compensation. 37 Statutes adopted before the current Federal
Constitution of 1988, such as the National Environmental Policy Act
35 "Where the advantage is, there is the burden or disadvantage." JOHN TRAYNER,
LATIN MAXIMS AND PHRASES 594-95 (3d ed. 1883).
36 C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 225 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "Todos
tem direito ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado, bern de uso comum do
povo e essencial A* sadia qualidade de vida, impondo-se ao Poder Pblico e A
coletividade o dever de defend6-1o e preservd- lo para as presentes e futuras
gerages. . . .As condutas e atividades consideradas lesivas ao meio ambiente
sujeitardo os infratores, pessoas fisicas ou juridicas, a sanq6es penais e
administrativas, independentemente da obrigagao de reparar os danos causados.").
37 See Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of
Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 83 (1992).
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of 1981, have been embraced by Brazilian courts in a protective
manner.
Additionally, despite the constitutional provision for com-
pensation under the chapter of social rights, a private right to recover
damages is still valid in the Brazilian legal system.38 Notwithstanding
that the protection of rights of this nature under the traditional tort
law theories of fault remains valid, Brazilian legal doctrine also
supports the application of strict liability in case of private claims for
environmental damages.39 This understanding finds ground in
Article 14 of the National Environmental Policy Act, which includes
not only the environment, a right held by the society, but also
affected third parties as beneficiaries of the strict liability scheme.40
However, as noted earlier, Brazil's 1988 Constitutional Assembly
recognized that the use of civil liability in an environmental context
should not be limited to the protection of private interests. This
position aimed, for example, to avoid the limitations of torts that do
not reflect the full cost of the damage caused to the environment,
where a loss suffered by an individual would not result in a sufficient
compensation able to fully fund the environmental recovery. Further,
in the absence of an individual victim, the Constitution would not
prevent third parties concerned with, or in charge of, environmental
38 See Lei No. 5.869, de 11 de Janeiro de 1973, D.O.U. de 27.07.2006 (Braz.).
Private parties may have their interests protected by an ordinary civil action, as long
as all lawsuit requirements are met. These requirements are "legal possibility" (when
there is a legal provision protecting the private interest, not limited to property
rights), "legitimacy of the parties" (requiring the plaintiff demonstrate that he/she is
acting on behalf of his/her own interests and not representing a third party, similar to
the American concept of "standing"), and "procedural interest" (ability of the court
to render a decision that can cure the harm, similar to the American concept
"redressability"). Id.
39 See Vladimir Passos de Freitas, Agdo Civil Pftblica e o Dano Individual [Public
Civil Action and the Private Harm], in A AQAO CIVIL POBLICA APOS 20 ANOS:
EFETIVIDADE E DESAFIOS [PUBLIC CIVIL ACTION AFTER 20 YEARS: CHALLENGES AND
EFFECTIVENESS] 591, 594 (2005).
40 See Lei No. 6.938, de 31 Agosto de 1981, D.O.U. de 02.09.1981 (Braz.).
2010
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
protection to pursue civil claims on behalf of the environment on its
own right.41
As a result, the Brazilian constitutional provision regarding
environmental protection is extremely long, detailed, and expan-
sive.42 Also, unlike other legal systems, Brazil does not enunciate a
right to a healthy or clean environment. Rather, when expressing a
right to an ecologically balanced environment, Brazil's Federal Consti-
tution implies that "nature is to be valued for its own sake," recog-
nizing "limits to growth" and the necessity of preserving the
"balance of nature," and rejects "the anthropocentric notion that
nature exists solely for human use."43
However, constitutional provisions go beyond this idyllic
concept and place environmental protection under the title regarding
the economic and financial order. As a result, the idea of balancing
constitutional values is strengthened by the wording of article 170
that states:
The economic order, founded on the appreciation of the
value of human work and on free enterprise, is intended
to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance
with the dictates of social justice, with due regard for the
following principles: ... the social function of property;
... environmental protection, including by differentiated
treatment in accordance with the environmental impact
of products and services and their respective production
and rendering.44
41 The transaction costs associated with establishing a defendant's liability would
also constrain the role of traditional tort law as a means for environmental
protection. MARK WILDE, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
55 (2002).
42 See Brandl & Bunger, supra note 37, at 75.
43 Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis,
33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 368 (2006) (describing what some sociologists identify as a
new environmental worldview or paradigm) (citing Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. Van
Liere, The New Environmental Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 10 (1978))).
44 C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 170 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "A ordem
econ6mica, fundada na valorizaqao do trabalho humano e na livre iniciativa, tern por
fim assegurar a todos existencia digna, conforme os ditames da justiqa social,
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Therefore, neither the environment nor development should
be an exclusive goal for the government or society. Indeed, the
Federal Constitution makes environmental protection a legal concern
for government and society to be considered just as they consider
other matters. Notwithstanding that the conciliation between envi-
ronmental protection and a free-enterprise economy represents a
thorny mission, Justice Herman Benjamin advertises that there is no
conflict between these constitutional values, since "the free enterprise
is not self-governing. It can only be qualified as 'free' if it satisfies
other constitutional principles, such as solidarity, which is the
opposite of the egocentrism recommended by [a] savage capitalism
[modell ."45
B. Standing: Public Ministry and Environmental Groups as Key
Players
Not only has Brazil decided to constitutionalize its environ-
mental goals explicitly, but this country has also incorporated
exhaustive provisions on standing as a strategy to better guaranty the
respect of these constitutional values. The Federal Constitution
confers civil standing on public prosecutors, comprised of members
of Federal and State Public Ministries. The most common-and
efficient-judicial proceeding applied to pursue damages due as a
result of an environmental harm is the public civil action (a(do civil
publica). Article 129 of the Federal Constitution reads:
observados os seguintes principios: .. .fungao social da propriedade; ... defesa do
meio ambiente, inclusive mediante tratamento diferenciado conforme o impacto
ambiental dos produtos e servigos e de seus processos de elaboraqAo e prestagao
.... .).
4' Atua!do destacada do Judicidrio favorece desenvolvimento de Direito Ambiental
no Brasil [Outstanding Performance of the Judiciary Favors Development of
Environmental Lmav in Brazil], SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIA (Jun. 5, 2010),
http://www.stj.gov.br/portalstj/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area-398&tmp.texto-9
7557 (original wording: "a livre iniciativa nao 6 irrestritamente 'livre'. Ela s6 6 livre
se cumpre outros principios previstos na pr6pria Constituiqdo como a solidariedade,
que 6 o oposto do egocentrismo preconizado pelo capitalismo selvagem .... ).
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The following are institutional functions of the Public
Ministry: ... to institute civil investigation and public civil
action to protect.., the environment and other diffuse
and collective interests; ... The standing of the Public
Prosecution for the civil actions . . . shall not preclude
those of third parties in the same cases .... 46
Called the greatest institutional novelty of the 1988 Consti-
tution,47 the Public Ministry received independence from the execu-
tive branch as necessary to fulfill its leading role in the protection of
the new set of diffuse and collective rights.48 As stated by a former
member of the Constitutional Assembly of 1988:
[W]e are creating an organ outside the scheme of the
three powers. It is an organ of enforcement that does not
fit any of the branches of Montesquieu's scheme. Why
are we proposing financial, political, and administrative
46 C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 129 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "Sao
funq6es institucionais do Minist~rio Publico: ... promover o inqu~rito civil e a aqdo
civil pblica, para a proteqdo ... do meio ambiente e de outros interesses difusos e
coletivos; ... A legitimaqfo do Minist~rio POblico para as aq6es civis previstas neste
artigo nao impede a de terceiros, nas mesmas hip6teses .... ").
47 LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 71 (2008) [hereinafter MCALLISTER, MAKING
LAW MATTER]. Although public prosecutors have been empowered to file lawsuits
for environmental harm since the mid-1980s', the 1988 Constitution granted the
Public Ministry administrative, political, financial, and budget-making autonomy. Id.
at 16-17, 71-72.
48 "In Brazilian law, 'diffuse interests' are interests held by an indeterminable
number of people or society as a whole [such as the right to an "ecologically
balanced environment"], while 'collective interests' refer to those of an identifiable
group of people [such as the rights of a determinate community affected by
hazardous waste]." Id. at 4 n. 5; see also Lei No. 8.078 art. 81(I)-(II), de 11 de
Setembro de 1990, D.O.U. de 12.09.1990 (Braz.). Under Brazil's law, the term
'public interests' is related to both diffuse and collective rights, having different
connotation from the one applied in the United States, where public interests refer to
the interests of the state rather than society.
V. is
Brazil's Lender Environmental Liability
autonomy for this organ? Because we want a strong
agent of legal enforcement.49
Under this new legal framework, Brazilian prosecutors
became central actors in environmental enforcement, changing the
prevailing notion that powerful economic and political actors could
violate environmental law with impunity. 50 In that regard, notwith-
standing the clear linkage between "prosecutorial environmental
enforcement" and the judiciary,51 it is not rare to see members of the
Public Ministry achieving their goals extrajudicially.
In this direction, once an environmental civil investigation is
mature,52 the prosecutor usually seeks for settlement before pre-
senting the case to court. Because these settlement agreements - so-
called "conduct adjustment agreements" 53 -not only avoid the time
and expenses associated with the judicial system, but also represent a
more cooperative and less adversarial enforcement process; they
49 McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 57 (quoting Plinio de Arruda
Sampaio (cited in Fdtbio Kerche, 0 Ministrio Pfiblico e a Constituinte de 1987188
[The Public Ministry and the Constitutional Assembly of 1987188], in 0 SISTEMA DE
JUSTIQA [THE JUSTICE SYSTEM] (Maria Tereza Sadek ed., 1998)). Plinio de Arruda
Sampaio is still active in Brazil's political scenario.
50 "Prosecutors view themselves as the representatives of societal interests, rather
than governmental interests." Lesley K. McAllister, Revisiting a "Promising
Institution": Public Law Litigation in the Civil Law World, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
693, 703 (2008) [hereinafter McAllister, Promising Institution].
51 Lesley K. McAllister, On Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: a Reply to
Professor Crawford's Review of Making Law Matter: Environmental Protection and
Legal Institutions in Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 649, 650 (2009) [here-
inafter McAllister, Environmental Enforcement].
52 While criminal investigations are led by the policy, the civil investigations are a
responsibility of the members of the Public Ministry.
53 "Conduct Adjustment Agreements" is a translation for "Compromisso de
Ajustamento de Conduta" or "Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta", which are
broadly recognized in Brazil by the acronym "TAC". See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de
Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.07.1985 (Braz.).
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have been identified by members of the Public Ministry as "the most
efficient option for both remediation and prevention of harm."54
Especially through the negotiation of conduct adjustment
agreements, the Public Ministry has consolidated its vocation to serve
as a forum for dispute resolution.55 Relying on techniques of negotia-
tion, this conciliatory approach may "allow for the continuation of
some arguably illegal behavior with the promise of compliance after
a certain time period or perhaps as a concession made in the course
of gaining other commitments." 56 However, it is important to note
that as prosecutors are dealing with trans-individual rights, 57 they
may only negotiate conditions of the deal, such as time, place, and
methods of compliance. There is no possibility to negotiate, for
example, the extent of the remediation. This "give-and-take" or
"reasonableness" strategy seeks to promote the development of
custom-built remedies that would not likely be achieved through the
judicial process.58
Due to the quasi-contractual nature of these agreements, 59 the
request of a financial guarantee as a condition for the deal is
emerging as a trend among public prosecutor negotiators. The
settlement following one of Brazil's most serious environmental
accidents illustrates the trend. In 2006, the release of two billion liters
54 McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 91 (quoting Antonio A. M.
de Camargo Ferraz & Jodo L. Guimardes Junior, A Necessciria Elabora¢do de uma
Nova Doutrina de Ministirio Pftblico Compativel corn seu Atual Perfil
Constitucional [The Necessary Preparation of a New Doctrine of Public Prosecution
Compatible with its Current Constitutional Profile], in MINISTtRIO PUBLICO:
INSTITUIQAO E PROCESSO [PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: ESTABLISHMENT AND PROCEDURE]
(Antonio A. M. de Camargo Ferraz ed., 1999)).
" Id. at 153.
56 McAllister, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 51, at 669.
57 See Lei No. 8.078 art. 81(I)-(II), supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58 See McAllister, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 51, at 669.
59 Conduct adjustment agreements are not under the category of contracts since the
Public Ministry has no power of disposal of "transindividual rights". See Hugo N.
Mazzilli, Compromisso de Ajustamento de Conduta: Evolit9do, Fragilidades e
Atua(Oo do Ministdrio Pftblico [Conduct Adjustment Agreements: Evolution,
Weaknesses, and the Public Ministry's Performance], 41 REVISTA DE DIREITO
AMBIENTAL [J. ENVTL. L.] 104, 104 (2006); See also A Lei 10.406, de 10 de Janeiro
de 2002, D.O.U. de 11.1.2002 (Braz.); C6digo Civil [C.C.] art. 841 (Braz.).
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of mining waste, from the rupture of tailing dams, displaced
thousands of people, inundated cultivated lands, and interrupted the
water supply of cities located in the states of Rio de Janeiro
(Northwest region) and Minas Gerais (Zona da Mata area).60 Through
a task force led by both the Federal Public Ministry and prosecutors
of the states of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, a conduct adjust-
ment agreement formalized the environmental covenants undertaken
by the mining company. As a guarantee for the compliance with the
covenants of the agreement, a bank account was opened to receive
the deposit of a security. 61 Bank guarantees, particularly the so-called
fian~a,62 may also comprise the collateral to assure performance of
"conduct adjustment agreements."
Financial institutions should be aware that conduct adjust-
ment agreements are instruments still under maturation. These
settlements demand particular attention from project finance lenders.
First, it is common to observe that, in general, conduct adjustment
agreements typically include an extensive list of positive and
negative covenants, but one straightforward general clause entitling
the Public Ministry to declare the conduct adjustment agreement in
default in the event of noncompliance. These characteristics may blur
the circumstances in which the Public Ministry is entitled to declare a
default, with the consequence that any collateral becomes due and
payable. Moreover, because the Public Ministry acts as the
60 See Universidade Federal de Vigosa, Impacto Ambiental Relevante na Bacia do
Rio Paraiba do Sul em Minas Gerais Rompimento de Barragem de Rejeitos
[Relevant Environmental Impact in the Paraiba do Sul River Basin in Minas Gerais
Rupture of Tailing Dam], ATLAS DIGITAL DAS AGUAS DE MINAS [DIGITAL
ATLAS OF THE MINE WATERS], http://www.atlasdasaguas.ufv.br/paraiba/
impacto ambiental relevante na bacia do rio paraiba do sul em minas-gerais.
html (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).
61 See Instituto Estadual de Florestas, Rio Pomba Assina Termo de Ajustamento de
Conduta [Rio Pomba signs Conduct Adjustment Agreement], PORTAL DO GOVERNO
DE MINAS GERAIS [Gov'T PORTAL OF MINAS GIRAIs], http://www.ief.mg.gov.
br/noticias/1/188-rio-pomba-assina-termo-de-ajustamento-de-conduta (last visited
Jun. 17, 2010).
62 See C.C. art. 818 (Braz.).
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"watchdog" of the law, 6 3 it is quite unlikely to exercise discretion in
forbearing from making a declaration of default, even if the breach of
the agreement is arguably not a material one. Second, project finance
lenders operating in Brazil usually rely on these settlement agree-
ments as evidence to support contractual warranties regarding, for
example, the likelihood of environmental claims. Actually, compli-
ance with a robust conduct adjustment agreement preempts further
lawsuits brought by the contracting party related to the object of the
deal. However, as these agreements are not yet mature, common
shortcomings, such as short-term solutions or technically inadequate
covenants,64 may jeopardize the expected effects of the deal. In fact,
conduct adjustment agreements are taken under the so-called rebus
sic stantibus ("matters so standing")65 condition. For instance, a
settlement agreement can be challenged before a court if further
environmental assessment demonstrates that control technologies
agreed in the deal are not capable of properly addressing harmful
effects of the activity. Hence, if further elements join the initial object
of the agreement, a resultant broader object is not subject to the initial
preemption and the case can be brought before a court. Third, as the
effects of conduct adjustment agreements apply among contracting
parties, there is no impediment to other actors with standing,
unsatisfied with the terms of the settlement, challenging the polluter
directly in court in the case of private players, and in the case of
governmental entities, challenging the polluter either through
extrajudicial instruments or through usual judicial proceedings. As
the current doctrine teaches, 66 conduct adjustment agreements are a
minimum guarantee in favor of society and cannot impede the access
of plaintiffs to other available remedies. Moreover, because these
quasi-contracts are made in favor of the community and not in favor
63 Expresion suggested by Lesley K. McAllister. See McAllister, Environmental
Enforcement, supra note 51, at 660.
64 Nevertheless, the creation of "Environmental Prosecution Support Centers,"
which, provide environmental technical knowledge for prosecutors, is noteworthy.
Prosecutors essentially base their negotiations on legal matters.
65 See TRAYNER, supra note 35, at 543.
66 See Mazzilli, supra note 59, at 108-10.
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of the contracting entity (in this case the Public Ministry), other actors
with standing may enforce the agreement judicially.
According to a 2009 study fund by the World Bank, from 1992
until mid-1998, the Federal Public Ministry agreed on 39 conduct
adjustment agreements related to environmental protection. How-
ever, this number has grown exponentially in the last decade. From
2000 to 2008, the Federal Public Ministry has made almost 500
conduct adjustment agreements. In addition, state prosecutors from
Brazil's Southeast and South regions have adopted a similar strategy
when pursuing environmental enforcement. For instance, the state of
Sao Paulo Public Ministry makes about 600 conduct adjustment
agreements per year.67
Notwithstanding these impressive numbers, "public civil
actions" are still the Public Ministry's flagship instrument. From 2006
to 2008, 65% of the environmental enforcement conducted by the
Federal Public Ministry has been accomplished through these
lawsuits. Prosecutors identify the influence some entrepreneurs have
within environmental agencies as one of the reasons that usually
makes a conduct adjustment agreement unviable. The entrepreneur
sometimes has the confidence that the environmental agency will
issue or renew a permit regardless of the illegal situation. As a result,
a lawsuit emerges as the only viable environmental enforcement
instrument.68
Additionally, as conduct adjustment agreements establish the
polluter's admission of causing the harm and the acceptance of the
stated penalty, their effects simplify the enforcement of the
67 See Instituto o Direito Por Um Planeta Verde [Law for a Green Planet Institute],
Compromisso de Ajustamento Ambiental: Andlise e Sugest5es para Aprimoramento
[Environmental Adjustment Agreements: Analysis and Suggestions for
Improvement], 65-77 (2009), avilable at http://www.mp.ba.gov.br/atuacao/ceama/
publicacao/2009/ compromissoajustamento ambiental.pdf.
68 It is common to see polluters arguing in court that they have been coerced to agree
on the terms of the "conduct adjustment agreements" because of the threat of a
potential lawsuit. However, this argument conflicts with the law which states that the
regular practice of a right cannot be considered a coercion. See id at 39, 73-75. See
also CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 153 (Braz.).
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agreement in court in the case of noncompliance. 69 In this context,
without regard to financial guarantees, there is no need to produce
any kind of evidence and "[s]uch lawsuits are won almost auto-
matically." 70 This is one reason why some defendants reject the
opportunity to settle by means of a conduct adjustment agreement,
preferring to contest the case directly before a court. 71
Brazilian scholars support that where the environmental
harm is unequivocal and the extrajudicial settlement has not been
achieved, the Public Ministry must file a public civil action in order to
impose civil liability or to prevent environmental harm.72 As there is
no need to establish actual damage caused, prosecutors will routinely
take preventive actions to compensate failures of administrative
control. Hence, the duty to bring a lawsuit where there is an environ-
mentally threatening activity is clearly associated with the active role
played by the Public Ministry when, for example, questioning major
infrastructure projects. When acting preventively, prosecutors usu-
ally resort to seeking preliminary injunctions. Under Brazilian civil
procedure law, if the delay of the judicial response may result in an
irreparable damage and the plaintiff is able to demonstrate the
verisimilitude of the claim, a preliminary injunction can be
requested. 73 According to the Superior Court of Justice, temporary
injunctions, in general, can be granted even before the defendant has
the opportunity to be heard. In a 2001 unanimous decision regarding
69 McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 91.
70 See Id. The enforcement of the agreement is sought through an ordinary action.
71 "While a popular image abounds of the prosecutor as the 'people's true defender',
there is another widespread image of the prosecutor as the 'irresponsible
exhibitionist."' McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 188 (citing
Maria Tereza Sadek & Rosangela Batista Cavalcanti, The Nev Brazilian Public
Prosectution: An Agent of Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN
LATIN AMERICA 221 (Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003). The
structure of Brazilian Public Ministry, which is a specialized, nonelective, and
autonomous institution, opens possibilities for abuse of prosecutorial power. Id
72 See McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 92-93.
73 In order to have the preliminary injunction granted, the party must present two
essential elements before a court: periculum in mora (literally "danger in delay") and
fJimus boni iuris (literally "appearance of good law"). See C.P.C., supra note 36, art.
273.
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temporary injunctions issued before or during a trial, the federal
court expressed: "[t]he adoption of precautionary measures
(including preliminary injunctions where the other party is not
heard) is essential for the proper exercise of the judicial service,
which should not face obstacles, apart from those found in the law." 74
Because the Brazilian judicial structure allows a series of proceedings
to seek reconsideration of a decision by a higher authority, injunction
battles frequently continue through reviews and reversals until a
court has the chance finally to decide the case.
Unlike the legal authority to make conduct adjustment
agreements, which is exclusive to public entities,75 the power to file a
suit on environmental damages has been broadly extended to
environmental groups. These plaintiffs also rely mainly on the Public
Civil Action Law (Lei de A~do Civil Ptiblica)76 which, despite the
availability of other instruments, 77 is the most frequent vehicle to
74 S.T.J., MC 2136-SC, Relator: Min. Jos6 Delgado, 22.5.2001, R.S.T.J., 20.8.2001
(Braz.) (original wording: "A adoqio de medidas cautelares (inclusive as liminares
inaudita altera pars) 6 fundamental para o pr6prio exercicio da fungo j urisdicional,
que nao deve encontrar obstftculos, salvo no ordenamento juridico.").
75 Jointly with the Public Ministry, environmental agencies and many other members
of the public administration are among these authorized public entities. All
authorized to make "conduct adjustment agreements" have standing to bring public
civil actions. See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, D.O.U., de 25.07.1985
(Braz.). However, it is not common to have environmental agencies bringing
lawsuits, since they usually prefer to apply administrative penalties such as fines
instead of going to court as a strategy to enforce environmental law. See McAllister,
MAKING LAW MATTER, supra note 47, at 93.
76 Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.07.1985 (Braz.).
17 Another important statute that regulates standing is the Popular Lawsuit Act (Lei
de Aqdo Popular), Lei No. 4.717, de 29 Junho de 1965, D.O.U. de 8.4.1974 (Braz.).
The right established in the statute, which was embraced by the Federal Constitution
in 1988 as a constitutional remedy under the article of fundamental rights, is not as
common or efficient as the Public Civil Suit Act, Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de
1985, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985 (Braz.). Regarding the people's legal action, according to
the Federal Constitution, "any citizen is a legitimate party to file a people's legal
action with a view to nullifying an act injurious to the public property or to the
property of an entity in which the State participates, to the administrative morality,
to the environment and to the historic and cultural heritage, and the author shall, save
in the case of proven bad faith, be exempt from judicial costs and from the burden of
2010
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
pursue remediation of, or compensation for, environmental damages
in court. According to article 5 of the statute, as amended in 2007, the
following have standing to bring public civil action resulting from
environmental harm:
I - the Public Ministry....
V - the Association that concurrently:
a) has been established for at least 1 (one) year
in accordance with the civil law; and
b) includes among its institutional purposes the
protection of the environment ....
§ 4 - The requirement of [the one year] pre-constitution
may be waived by the judge when there is a manifest
social interest evidenced by the size or characteristics of
the damage or the relevance of the legally protected
interest. 78
The existence of a specific statute authorizing invocation of
the judicial process, combined with the broad constitutional right to
an "ecologically balanced environment," makes the question of
standing independent of an alleged personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy. Based on this liberal standing law, for example, a
non-governmental organization (NGO) does not need to demonstrate
in court that its members have individualized injuries.79 While local
defeat." C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 50, LXXIII (original wording: "qualquer cidad~o 6
parte legitima para propor agao popular que vise a anular ato lesivo ao patrim6nio
publico ou de entidade de que o Estado participe, d moralidade administrativa, ao
meio ambiente e ao patrim6nio hist6rico e cultural, ficando o autor, salvo
comprovada mt-f&, isento de custas judiciais e do 6nus da sucumb~ncia.").
78 Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.07.1985 (Braz.) (original
wording: "Thm legitimidade para propor a aqdo principal e a aqo cautelar: I - o
Minist~rio Phblico . . . V - a associagAo que, concomitantemente: a) esteja
constituida hft pelo menos 1 (urn) ano nos termos da lei civil; b) inclua, entre suas
finalidades institucionais, a proteqao ao meio ambiente.... § 4.0 0 requisito da pr6-
constituiqgo podera ser dispensado pelo juiz, quando haja manifesto interesse social
evidenciado pela dimensao ou caracteristica do dano, ou pela relevdncia do bern
juridico a ser protegido.").
79 See FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 377 379 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972)).
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and less representative NGOs traditionally prefer to make a
complaint to the Public Ministry rather than filing public civil actions
themselves,80 major international environmental groups usually
decide to act directly in the case. On the one hand, such broad
standing and civil environmental liability regimes largely affect
entities that most profit from environmental resources. On the other
hand, this Brazilian scheme of environmental protection can be
turned into a draconian strategy to look for "deep pocket" defend-
ants, especially financial institutions. Although the lower courts have
not yet had the occasion clearly to follow the December 2009 Superior
Court of Justice decisions on lender liability, Brazilian Public
Prosecutors and NGOs have already figured out how powerful (and
threatening) they can be. The three approaches of similar nature that
follow illustrate their realization. The first was carried out by an
international NGO. The second was performed by Federal and State
Public Ministries. Case three was led by local NGOs with the support
of international environmental groups.
Case 1: December, 2006
The NGO International Rivers, which is associated with non-
governmental organizations constituted under Brazilian Law, wrote a
letter to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
expressing concerns with the possible participation of this MDB in
the financing of the Madeira River Hydroelectric Dam project in
Brazil, comprised of the Santo Antonio (3,150 MW) and Jirau (3,450
MW) projects. These projects are part of the larger "IIRSA Project",81
intended to promote the development of transport, energy and
communications infrastructure in South America. The formal answer
provided by the IDB stated that, notwithstanding the environmental
80 In the case that less representative environmental groups decide to bring
environmental lawsuits themselves, it is common to observe the Public Ministry
joining the case as eminent plaintiffs.
8! INICIATIVA PARA LA INTEGRACION DE LA INFRAESTRUCTURA REGIONAL
SURAMERICANA [INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
IN SOUTH AMERICA], www.iirsa.org (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
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concerns communicated by the NGO, the IDB considers not only the
domestic law of the host country, but applies in every project higher
standards based on its own environmental policies.82
Case 2: April, 2009
Federal and State Public Prosecutors started a civil investigation into
environmental harms caused by infrastructure projects in Brazil's
northeastern State of Bahia. Even though these projects had received
all permits needed, engineers contracted by prosecutors concluded
that the environmental impact assessment (EIS) was not adequate for
the scope of the project. They accordingly filed a suit against local
authorities, arguing that permits should be suspended. Meanwhile,
prosecutors have formally advised banks that Brazilian law covers
financial institutions as liable parties for their clients' environmental
harms. They also recommended to the banks that they suspend
disbursements to those projects.83
Case 3: March, 2010
Twenty-two environmental groups, supported by 47 additional
NGOs, including leading organizations such as Greenpeace, WWF
Brazil, and Friends of the Earth-Brazil, formally notified the
Brazilian Development Bank that this financial institution would be
found jointly and severally liable for environmental damages if it
were to decide to finance the Belo Monte Hydroelectric dam (11,233
MW). Their grounds are not only in the Brazilian law but also in the
argument that the agency responsible for the permitting process, the
Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
82 See Letter from Alfredo Barechea, External Relations Advisor, Inter-Am. Dev.
Bank, to Glenn Switkes, Amazon Program Dir., Int'l Rivers Network (Dec. 13,
2006), available at http://www.amazonia.org.br/arquivos/228569.pdf (last visited
Mar. 7, 2010).
83 See Letter from Mist~rio Piblico Fed. and Minist~rio Pfiblico do Estado da Bahia,
to HSBC Bank Braz. (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.prba.mpf.gov.br/mpf-
noticias/recomendacao mpf 014-2009 a instituicao financeira pddu e paralela -
_banco hsbc .pdf/at download/file (last visited De. 16, 2010).
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(IBAMA), issued the preliminary environmental permit,84 the first
out of three stages in the permitting scheme, without regard to the
conclusion of its technical staff which has pointed out that, up to that
point, there were not enough elements to certify the environmental
viability of the project.85 Notwithstanding the notification, the
Brazilian Development Bank announced in April 2010 its willingness
to finance up to 80% of the total project capital cost (US$ 11 billion)
and that environmental costs are among financeable items.86
Members of the Public Ministry and NGOs have identified
that targeting financial institutions is a viable alternative to pursue
their environmental protection goals. As a first measure, they are
attempting to effectively-and timely-stop the development of
projects by threatening banks and thereby avoiding the overloaded
Brazilian judicial system, where the "index of congestion" can reach
astonishing average rates of 76.1% in federal trial courts and 59.8 % in
federal courts of appeal. 87 There is no doubt that, as already
demonstrated in the case in which the Brazilian Development Bank
84 According to Brazil's environmental regulation, a preliminary environmental
permit (Licenqa Pr~via LP) is granted when the environmental agency approves
the location and design of the project, certifies that the project is environmentally
viable, and establishes basic requirements and conditions to be fulfilled in the next
stages of the project's implementation. See Resoluqao Conama No. 237, de 19 de
Dezembro de 1997, D.O.U de 12.22.97 (Braz.).
85 See Demand Letter from Sindicato dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras Rurais de
Senador Jos6 Porfirio et al., to Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e
Social (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.amazonia.org.br/arquivos/
349285.pdf (according to this demand letter, the technical staff statement is
identified as Nota Thcnica do IBAMA No. 04/2010).
86 See BNDES Define Condiqges do Apoio ii Construido da Hidrelitrica de Belo
Monte[BNDES Sets the Conditions for Supporting Construction of Belo Monte
Dam], BANCO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO [BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK]
(Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes pt/Institucional/
Sala de Imprensa/Noticias/2010/energia/20100416 Belo Monte.html.
87 See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIQA [BRAZILIAN NATIONAL COUNSEL OF
JUSTICE], http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/imprensa/justica em numeros 2008.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2010) ("Index of congestion" (Taxa de Congestionamento) is
calculated through the equation T I - Sent. / (CN + Cpj), where Sent - Decisions;
CN New Cases; Cpj - Cases in Backlog).
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has been called as defendant, as a second measure, the Public
Ministry and NGOs will bring suits against financial institutions
demanding damages for environmental harm to their clients. The
strict, joint and several liability can be applied in a very harsh and
severe manner against financial institutions that have relied solely on
the environmental impact assessments, performed by governmental
agencies and their permitting proceedings.
Although it is possible to suggest that this alternative
approach may positively affect environmental protection in Brazil,
the substitution of prosecutorial and judicial actors for a perceived
non-responsive public administration is a pathological situation.88
Moreover, the ambition to have lenders undertake a further kind of
responsibility -usually neglected by the bureaucracy-may make
Brazil's environmental enforcement structure and its functionality
even more irregular. Because environmental problems are technically
complex, the substitution of the public administration for other actors
would not likely result in efficient environmental protection in the
long-run. In fact, systematic enforcement, which can only be accom-
plished by the public administration, is much more desirable because
it is far more effective than sporadic interventions. 89 Additionally, the
public administration is the actor able to combine the analysis of
cumulative environmental impacts of a project in accordance with
future developments in the region. Moreover, other than the public
administration, other actors can respond only under specific
circumstances and, in many cases, after an environmental harm has
already occurred.
88 See Patrick Del Duca, Italian Judicial Activism in Light of French and American
Doctrines of Judicial Review and Administrative Decisionmaking: The Case of Air
Pollution 82 (Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper No. 89/386, 1989) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Del Duca, Judicial Activism].
89 See Patrick Del Duca, /1 Giudice ltaliano e Statunitense: il Contrastofra Strategie
di Sostituzione e di Controllo della pubblica amministrazione [Activism of Italian
Judges with Respect to Acting in Place of the Public Administration], 374
GIURISDIZIONE ETUTELA DELL'AMBIENTE 376, 392 (1986).
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C. Parallel Initiatives of the Government
Undeniably, due to their active involvement in environ-
mental matters, judges, prosecutors, and NGOs are shaping Brazil's
law enforcement. As legal institutions substitute themselves for the
public administration, political and economic costs are being
imposed on the sustainable development of the country.90
In fact, the origins of those instruments now essential for
environmental enforcement, namely conduct adjustment agreements
and public civil actions, arise in the same context that generated the
democratic Constitution of 1988. As that constitution established a
new generation of rights, an original scheme based on exercise of
diffuse and collective interests to protect them emerged as a
necessity. Indeed, this protective scheme arose from the historical
inability of the Executive branch to properly organize and direct the
public administration.
These historical difficulties are a result of complex factors. 91
First, notwithstanding the adoption of pluralistic democratic politics
in the 1980's in reaction to the military dictatorship regime estab-
lished in 1964, the coalition politics and lack of alternation of the
holders of power impeded development of an impartial, competent
administration. Although governments change often, the configure-
tion of the governing coalitions is remarkably stable, and because
political parties have found in the administrative structure a useful
alternative to increase their power, the lack of alternation in political
control has proven a fertile ground for patronage. 92 Second, in a
country where unemployment, informality, and low wages are
common,93 there is a tendency to see employment in the public
90 See Del Duca, Judicial Activism, supra note 88, at 1-2.
9' See Del Duca, Judicial Activism, supra note 88, at 6 13. A similar situation has
been identified in Italy after World War II.
92 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Scandals Puts Pressure on a Brazilian Leader to Step
Down, N.Y. TIMES, August 7, 2009, at A8.
93 In May 2010, the average wage in main metropolitan areas, such as Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, was US$800. Monthly Survey of Industrial Employment and Wages,
BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND STATISTICS, available at
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administration not only as the only worthwhile career opportunity, 94
but also as a social welfare program. 95 Third, applying an
organizational model that is not able to break with a culture of
bureaucracy, 96 the public administration fails to correspond to the
real necessities of the country. For example, at the 2008 National
Conference of the Brazilian Federal Bar Association Council (OAB
Conselho Federal), its counselor for the state of Amazonas (the largest
state in the Amazon region) alarmed the participants with the
information that the urban Ibirapuera Park in Sdo Paulo (1.6 km 2)
had - at that time - 300 environmental inspectors, exactly the same
number of inspectors of the federal environmental agency that were
responsible for the entire Brazilian Amazon Forest (approximately 4.2
million km 2).97 These numbers, in fact, reflect another reality. Even
though the pursuit of a public position attracts about millions of
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/indicadores/industria/pimes/default.shtm
(follow "Click here to download all the editions of the Monthly Survey of Industrial
Employment and Wages" hyperlink; then follow "pimes 201005caderno.zip"
hyperlink).
94 After a 3 years tenure period, every employee of the federal public administration
who has passed a civil service exam has the right to keep his/her job permanently,
except if there is a final judicial or administrative decision against it. Only in 1998,
performance assessment has been included as part of the tenure and the basis of this
assessment are still under development. Cf C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 40 (Braz.).
95 For example, in May 2010, Brazilian Senate resumed the discussion regarding a
bill that would make unpaid the application for federal civil service exam for
unemployed. See Projeto de Lei do Senado No. 76/2004 de I de Abril de 2004
(Braz.), available at http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t-
80252&tp-1.
96 See Leonardo Secchi, Modelos Organizacionais e Reforma da Administra(0o
Pfiblica [Organizational Models and Public Administration Reform], 43 REVISTA DE
ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA [RAP] 347, 347 (2009).
97 See XX ConferOncia: Amaz6nia e Parque do Ibirapuera tm o mesmo minmero de
fiscais [The Amazon and lbirapuera Park Have the Same Number of Inspectors],
ORDEM DOS ADVOGADOS DO BRASIL-CONSELHO FEDERAL (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.oab.org.br/noticia.asp?id-15169. ibirapuera Park is managed by the
government of the municipality of Sio Paulo. The numbers of the federal
environmental agency is related to the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) agency which has the legal assignment, for
example, to grant federal environmental permits and control environmental quality.
Lei No. 7.735, de 22 de Fevereiro de 1989, D.O.U. de 23.2.1989 (Braz.).
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applicants per year in Brazil, 98 positions in remote locations remain
unattractive. Indeed, this point helped to motivate the 2010 federal
environmental service strike. Demonstrators asserted that office
positions have the same or better payment than those which involve
serious risks.99 Finally, even being an economic giant and one of the
world's biggest democracies, corruption breeds distrust. According
to a 2009 survey led by Transparency International, the global
coalition against corruption, Brazil fell below the ideal score for
perceived level of public-sector corruption.100
The need for improving management is not restricted to the
context of the Brazilian environmental system. In that regard, the
executive branch is working on tools "to transform the Brazilian
Federal bureaucracy into a modern, results-oriented entity that
effectively provides public goods and services that are demanded by
98 Civil service exams have developed a 30 billion dollar market, including, for
example, preparation courses and publishers. See Ernando Pimentel, Concurso
P iblico o "Boom" do Momento, ASSOCIAQAO NACIONAL DE PROTEQAO E APoIo
AO CONCURSO POBLICO, http://www.anpac.org.br/portal/index.php/artigos/82-
concurso-publico-o-qboomq-do-momento (last visited Jun. 29, 2010).
99 See Letter from Comando Nacional de Greve dos Servidores do MMA, Ibama,
Instituto Chico Mendes e Servigo Florestal Brasileiro, to Maria do Socorro M.
Gomes, Human Resources Head, Planning, Budget and Management Ministry (Jun.
2, 2010), available at http://www.asibama.org.br/asibama/index.php?content,
0,0,1 145,0,0.html.
100 See International Transparency, Corruption Perception Index 2009,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 1, available at http://www.transparency.org/
content/download/47599/761843/CPI+2009+Regional+Highlights+Americas
en.pdf (last visited Jun. 29, 2010). "Among the 31 countries from the Americas
included in Transparency International's (TI) 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index
(CP1), 10 scored above 5 (out of 10) while 21 scored less than 5 indicating a serious
corruption problem. Overall, nine countries failed to exceed a score of 3, indicating
rampant corruption. With the exception of Guatemala, no country in the region
showed a substantial increase in its CPI score .... Among the nine countries that
fell below a score of 5 are Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Mexico, all leading economies
in the region which should become anti-corruption strongholds but have been rocked
by scandals involving impunity, kickbacks, political corruption and state capture."
Id.
2010
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
citizens." 10 1 While the bureaucracy is not yet effective and efficient,
the government is acting in parallel, pursuing, as much as possible,
the protection of the environment.
In this context, in 2009, the Ministry of the Environment
(Ministdrio do Meio Anibiente- MMA) invited financial institutions to
jointly commit to the "Green Protocol" (Protocolo Verde). Govern-
ment-owned banks adhered first 0 2 and then the Brazilian Federation
of Banks (Febraban) joined the commitment with some variances in its
original wording.103 Both committed on a best efforts basis.
Among many provisions of the initial document signed by
government-owned banks, the one which states that the signatories
should "perform the social and environmental analysis of clients
whose activities require [an] environmental permit and/or represent
significant adverse social impacts" is problematic. 104 The "and/or"
provision creates a significant legal uncertainty. Notwithstanding
that the Federal Constitution states that government and society
share the duty to defend the environment, it also clearly expresses
that the government itself has the duty to require an environmental
impact assessment (EIA). Article 225 of the Federal Constitution
reads:
101 WORLD BANK, Brazil: Planning for Performance in the Federal Government, in 1
REVIEW OF PLURIANNUAL PLANNING, at iii (2002).
102 Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e Social (BNDES), Caixa
Econ6mica Federal (CEF), Banco do Brasil S/A (BB), Banco da Amaz6nia S/A
(BASA), and Banco do Nordeste (BNB)) commited to the first version of the Green
Protocol. Protocolo Verde, BANCO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO EcONoMICO E
SOCIAL [hereinafter Protocolo Verde, Government Owned Banks], http://www.
bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes pt/Galerias/Arquivos/empresa/
download/ProtocoloVerde.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
103 Protocolo Verde, FEDERAQAO BRASILEIRA DE BANCOS [hereinafter Protocolo
Verde, Febraban], http://www.febraban.org.br/p5a 52gt34++5cv8 4466+ff145
afbb52ffrtg33fe36455li541 lpp+e/sitefebraban/PROTOCOLO%20DE%201NTEN%
C7%D5ES.PDF (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
104 Protocolo Verde, Government Oivned Banks, supra note 102 (emphasis added)
(original wording: "Efetuar a anftlise socioambiental de clientes cujas atividades
exijam o licenciamento ambiental e/ou que representem significativos impactos
sociais adversos."). Id.
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In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right [to an
ecologically balanced environment], it is incumbent
upon the Government to . . . . demand in the manner
prescribed by law, for the installation of works and active-
ties which may potentially cause significant degradation
of the environment, a prior environmental impact study,
which shall be made public .... 105
The Federal Constitution is straightforward in stating that the
demand for a prior environmental study should be in accordance to
the law.
Underneath the obscure terms of the "Green Protocol,"
government-owned banks are supposed to be the beams of the
balance when pondering the constitutional values of environmental
protection and economic growth, which contradicts the National
Policy Act when stating that the Environmental National Council
(CONAMA) will determine the cases where a beneficiary should lose
or have suspended its participation in credit lines from official
funding entities, such as government-owned banks. Moreover,
Brazilian law only conditions official funding on the presentation of
environmental permits and further compliance regulations. 106
On the one hand, the option for the term "client," instead of
"borrower" or "project," imposes greater exposure for financial insti-
tutions under Brazilian environmental lender liability. This commit-
ment creates a possible nexus of causation for environmental
damages that would not exist under the statutory law in force. On the
other hand, by selecting such a broad concept-without defining its
content-the text of the document makes the commitment weaker
and vague. In the legal and financial worlds, it is hard to welcome
such ambiguous terms, conditions and risks.
105 C.F. Oct. 15, 1988, art. 225 (Braz.) (emphasis added) (original wording: "§ 1V -
Para assegurar a efetividade desse direito, incumbe ao Poder Piblico .... IV -
exigir, na forma da lei, para instalaqgo de obra ou atividade potencialmente
causadora de significativa degradago do meio ambiente, estudo pr~vio de impacto
ambiental, a que se darft publicidade .... ). Id.
106 Lei No. 6938, de 31 Agosto de 1981, D.O.U. de 02.09.1981 (Braz.).
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Notwithstanding the revised and more realistic terms com-
mitted by the Brazilian Federation of Banks, they also bring alarming
provisions for stakeholders willing to invest capital in Brazil. For
instance, this second "Green Protocol"' indicates that its signatories
should "apply social and environmental performance standards
according to the economic sector when assessing projects with
medium and high impacts." 10 7 It is a clear command-and-control
provision being transferred to banks' management, since this
provision appears in parallel to the governmental permitting system,
which is the most appropriate opportunity to regulate private
activities. In that regard, the National Environmental Policy Act
specifies that CONAMA will establish performance standards that
enable the rational use of environmental resources. This statute also
allows states and municipalities to determine their own rules since
they supplement and complete the federal regulation. As a result,
only proposed actions which meet these criteria could be granted an
environmental permit which would bind banks' activities. Hence, the
"Green Protocol" tends to establish an unbearable and conflicting
situation of lenders having to substitute themselves for the public
administration also in the development of environmental parameters.
It is important to note that, following the global demand for
accountability, which suggests that companies need to listen to their
stakeholders and to include their interests in companies' decision
making processes, lenders do have an active role in promoting
sustainable development. Achievements of some standards, such as
FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index,10 8 indeed
demonstrate, notwithstanding that profits are the purpose of
corporations, that shareholders have understood that companies
need to seek other goals as well, including stakeholder benefits. 10 9
107 Protocolo Verde, Febraban, supra note 103 (original wording: "aplicar padroes
de desempenho socioambientais por setor produtivo para avaliaqgo de projetos de
m6dio e alto impactos negativos."). Id.
108 See Mike Scott, Certification: Respectability that Provides Investors with Peace
of Mind, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jun. 3, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6bf469cO-6ddb-
11 df-b5c9-00144feabdcO.html#axzzl 8goPra7g.
'09 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford?, 3 VA. L. &
Bus. REV. 163 (2008).
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However, while this modern business model, on a superficial level,
may be misunderstood as consistent with the demands lenders are
facing in Brazil, a deeper analysis challenges this hypothesis. Brazil's
emerging environmental enforcement is not simply requesting an
expansive role of lenders, as suggested by a sustainability-driven
trend. Instead, the ambitious goals indentified in that country go
beyond this so as to establish lenders as an alternative to a func-
tioning public administration.
As a result, notwithstanding the noble environmental goals of
the "Green Protocol," the current framework established by this
document, combined with environmental protection centralized in
legal actors, creates unpromising conditions for the country's com-
petition for investment capital. Brazil's overall scenario that includes
strict, joint and several environmental liability and a bureaucracy at
best crawling to evolve into a performance-oriented structure, not
only allows, but principally encourages a draconian "deep-pocket"
strategy against lenders. This government inefficiency would result
in another "significant slice of the custo Brasil, the shorthand term for
the premium price of doing business in the country."11 0 The "Green
Protocol," in this context, can also work as a serious detour from the
right-and necessary-path towards the improvement of govern-
mental procedures that will be able to support the development of
the country in sustainable ways.
III. LESSONS FROM THE U.S. REGIME ON LENDER
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
In the 1980's, the architecture of environmental liability in the
United States also intimidated financial institutions. The Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)11 ' emerged under a broad effort to recover costs from
'0 See Harvey Morris, Ports: Traffic Grows at Double the Rate of Economy,
FINANCIAL TIMES, May 6, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c06a742a-
57 1c- I1 df-aaff-00144feab49a.html#axzz 18gpuAcE4.
ll' Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
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defendants who had engaged in "practices that were, in many cases,
legal at the time they were used, and often encouraged, directly or
indirectly, by government." 112
CERCLA's retrospective imposition of liability coincides with
the emerging Brazilian environmental liability scheme.113 "CERCLA
imposes strict, joint, and retroactive liability on a statutorily defined
group of persons for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste that
has been 'released' into the environment." Additionally, "[clourts
had interpreted liability under this provision to be 'joint and several'
... [because] Congress did not specify [whether] the liability under
CERCLA would be joint and several, [thus] it authorized courts to so
find."114
In 1990, The Eleventh Circuit shocked financial institutions
and secured creditors in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.115 The court
determined that "a secured creditor may incur .. .liability, without
being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a
facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous waste." 116 Moreover, "[i]n order to achieve
the 'overwhelming remedial' goal of CERCLA statutory scheme,
ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability
"117
Understanding that secured creditors can be involved in the
management of their debtors' business in order to protect their
112 FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 890-91.
113 The resulting liability from CERCLA differs from the Brazilian scheme in some
points. A first distinction is that CERCLA is limited to hazardous waste cleanup
costs. Second, this statute identifies two categories of response: (i) a private part
cleanup or (ii) a federally financed cleanup: "[W]here the responsible party cannot
initially be found or is unable to provide cleanup measures, [then] the Fund can be
used to clean up and later recover the costs from responsible party." Finally,
CERCLA establishes clear categories of potentially liable parties and describes what
they are liable for, whereas in Brazilian law, the broad term "polluter" is applied to
indicate who can be liable for environmental damages. See FABER ET AL., supra note
15, at 892-93.
114 FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 891, 893.
115 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990). See also FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 926.
116 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
117 id.
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security interests, this court's decision recognized what the market
had already come to appreciate as sound banking practice. Indeed,
through a detailed study on large risks published in 2009, Fitch
Ratings found that environmental concerns should not be overlooked
or underestimated, because it is riskier to have them identified only
after resources have been previously committed. 18 As a result,
especially in the conception and implementation of an infrastructure
enterprise, lenders should be aware of environmental risks and use
their influence as much as possible to achieve implementation of
good environmental practices to insure that their interests are being
adequately protected.
In order to illustrate how the market has already learned that
"projects must be realized because they are fully desirable and viable,
not only because there is funding available," 119 consider the frustra-
ted first attempt to dig the Panama Canal in 1880, whose French
developer underestimated environmental factors that were decisive
for the complete failure of the project. Consequently, the economics
of the project became unviable. In particular, the financial model was
not prepared to accommodate necessary changes in the design and
timetable of the project 20 Recently, other giant projects have also
initially underestimated environmental impact concerns, such as the
European Oresund Bridge12' (Denmark-Sweden) and the Vasco da
118 See NICOLAS PAINVIN, FITCH RATINGS, LARGE PROJECTS, GIANT RISKS? LESSONS
LEARNED SUEZ CANAL TO BOSTON'S BIG DIG 5 (2009), available at
http://www.finance-quebec.com/Fitch%/o2OLarge%/o2OProjects,%/o2OGiant%/ 20Risks.
pdf. Fitch Ratings, along with Moody's and Standard & Poors, is one of the leading
credit rating agencies in connection with issuances of securities.
119 Id at 1.
120 "The Panama Canal Company was consequently liquidated. At that time, the
construction had only reached about 40% (12.6 km) and already cost more than
twice the total initial budget." Id. at 10.
121 "The construction contract was signed in March 1991, before any environmental
impact assessment study (EIA) was carried out .... Works ended in July 2000, three
months ahead of schedule but with the bridge coast to coast structure 25% and the
landside infrastructure 70% over budget. This cost overrun is mostly attributable to
changes in design due to enhanced environmental and safety standards." Id. at 13-14.
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Gama Bridge122 (Portugal), which have incurred significant cost
overruns.
The five dimensions for project finance exposure identified by
the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) are: the financial strength
of the project; the political and legal environment; transaction
characteristics; the strength of sponsor; and the quality of the security
package.1 23 These dimensions suggest the sources of increased risk
associated with postponement of environmental risk assessment and
management. Environmental concerns can easily affect all these
dimensions. Two of them, political and legal environment, and
quality of the security package, offer particular opportunity for
environmental matters to augment the risks. These are good reasons
that secured lenders ordinarily have some involvement in
environmental affairs of their debtors.
As a result of these attentive lending practices, U.S. courts,
such as the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, concluded that "banks
could greatly advance CERCLA's goals." 124 Based on the polluter-
pays principle,125 which is a principle that also directs Brazil's
environmental law, CERCLA pursues its goals by targeting those
companies and persons who most profited from risky disposal
practices. 126 Therefore, CERCLA statutorily expressed that "owners
122 "After construction had already started in February 1995, the environmental
lobbyists obtained design modifications to address mitigation of wetland and bird
preservation issues, traditionally highly sensitive in a river mouth area. This entailed
important design variations, which could have been addressed upfront if the
environmental impact studies had been conducted before." Id at 15-16.
123 Bank of International Settlement, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards 231-237 (2005), available at http:/www.
bis.org/publ/bcbsI 1 8.pdf.
124 See Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation
Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J., 925, 927 (1989).
125 "The core of the polluter pays principle argues that neither the government nor
society-at-large should subsidize pollution and polluters and that polluters should
internalize the costs of pollution abatement . . . . Finally, the principle has a
pedagogical effect of encouraging individual responsibility for pollution and in
general." Jonathan R. Nash, Too much market? Conflict between tradable pollution
allowances and the "polluter pays" principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 468
(2000).
126 FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 891.
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and operators," "arrangers," and "transporters" are potentially liable
parties.127 Lenders, through their capacity to influence the borrowers'
environmental practices could find themselves within in the "owners
and operators" category.
127 FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 904. Through section 107, CERCLA establishes
four categories of potentially liable parties and describes what they are liable for. For
the purpose of this study, current owner and operator and the former owner and
operator will be considered under the same category. CERCLA section 107 reads:
"Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section--(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a
facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the
costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title. The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall
include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D).
Such interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified
amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned. The
rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable under
this section shall be the same rate as is specified for interest on investments of the
Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of
Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to interest under this
subsection, the term "comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to the
date on which interest accruing under this subsection commences." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (2006).
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Hence, "the key issue in determining lender liability under
CERCLA revolves around the element or degree of control attributed
to the lender."128 In that regard, courts failed to agree on a uniform
interpretation of CERCLA's secured creditor's exemption.129 This
lender's safeguard results from the provision that the term "owner
and operator" does not include "a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."1 30 In
fact, two central controversies emerged from different courts'
interpretation of the statute's terms: "participation in management"
and "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest." Namely, controversy arose concerning "first, whether a
lender who implements a loan workout plan, or places a loan officer
on a borrower's advisory board to ensure repayment of the loan, will
inadvertently incur liability as an 'operator' under CERCLA; and
second, whether a lender who forecloses on contaminated property
when a borrower defaults on a loan will incur liability as an
'owner."' 131
In 1990, the participation-management controversy became
evident.1 32 In In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.1 33 liability was not extended to
the issuer of bonds which provided funds for Bergsoe Metals Cor-
poration's recycling plant, whose facilities had been abandoned after
the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In this case, the court
declared that a secured creditor would fall outside CERCLA's
secured creditor's exemption only if there were some actual
management of the facility. As a result, "what the lender had actually
done and not what the lender was capable of doing" was the central
128 Michael I. Jeffery, Environmental Liability: A Continuing Concern for Lenders,
in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 49, 51 (2003).
129 Cases that here illustrate that fact have been examined by different federal courts.
,3 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2006).
131 Lisa G. Dwyer, Relief from CERCLA's 'Rock and a Hard Place': The Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act, 3 ENVTL. L.,
862-63 (1997).
132 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
133 In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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point of court's assessment.134 On the other hand, in Fleet Factors, a
narrower management-participation theory of liability was adopted
in such a way that an involvement "sufficiently broad to support the
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it
chose" would trigger lender liability.135 Consequently, a lender with a
mere capability to make an actual decision on waste disposal would
incur CERCLA's liability. The Fleet Factors court launched the "could
affect" standard.136
Likewise, courts failed to establish a uniform interpretation of
the phrase "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest." 137 This second-and earlier -controversy is illu-
strated by different outcomes resulting from United States v.
Mirabile138 and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust.139 In Mirabile,
the first case that directly addressed lender liability under
CERCLA,140 the defendant, a lender that foreclosed on contaminated
property and then purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, was
not found liable because the court understood that the creditor's acts
were undertaken to protect its security interest, and as a result, the
exemption should be applied.' 41 In this direction, the "court ignored
the lender's actual ownership of the property and instead made a
judgment based solely on what it believed motivated the lender's
actions." 142 Conversely, in Maryland Bank & Trust, a case with facts
similar to those found in Mirable, another federal court held that the
security interest exemption would not protect the lender that
134 Joanne S. Liu, Lender Liability Protection in the Aftermath of CERCLA's
Security Interest Exemption Crisis: Treating Lenders Like Lender, 17 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 575, 589 (1998).
135 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-1158 (1 1th Cir. 1990).36 See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Trinitz Industries, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1427
(D. Kan 1995).
137 Dwyer, supra note 131, at 864.
138 No. 84-2280, 1985 WL 97 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)
139 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
140 Liu, supra note 134, at 582.
141 Dwyer, supra note 131, at 864.
142 Liu, supra note 134, at 583.
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foreclosed and acquired a secured property.143 Hence, the court held
that as the mortgagee became an owner of the property, the security
exemption was lost.144
Notwithstanding, courts have not established a uniform
definition for secured creditor exemption's decisive phrases; courts
had a tendency to interpret them narrowly. 145 The clamor of the
banking community and the fact that federal government was
increasing its role as a secured creditor, in connection with its inter-
ventions in the banking system, pressed the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Accordingly, in 1992, the EPA issued a
regulation clarifying lender liability under CERCLA.146 The EPA's
rule explicitly defined (i) "indicia of ownership," (ii) "participation in
management," and (iii) "primarily as security interest."147 In 1994,
however, in Kelley v. EPA, 148 the rule was vacated on the ground that
the EPA lacked authority to issue rules interpreting the secured
creditor exemption as a binding regulation. 49 According to the
holding, Congress "designated the courts and not the EPA as
adjudicator of the scope of CERCLA liability."150
Then, in 1996, Congress amended the statute's lender liability
provisions to more firmly entrench the EPA regulatory framework.
Essentially, the new rule-Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and
Deposit Insurance Protection Act 151 - determines that secured
creditors can be considered an "owner or operator" only if they
143 Id. at 583.
144 Dwyer, supra note 131, at 864 (quoting Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at
580).
145 id.
146 Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,382 (Apr. 29, 1992)
(codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §300.1100).
147 Dwyer, supra note 131, at 865.
148 Kelley v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
149 Memorandum from Barry Breen, EPA Director Office of Site Remediation
Enforcement, to Regional Counsels et al. (June 30, 1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/lendr-aquis-
mem.pdf.
150 Liu, supra note 134, at 592 (quoting Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d at 1107-08).
151 Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2501-2505, 110 Stat. at 3009-462 to 469 (1996)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20), 9607(n), 6991b(h)(9)).
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actually participate in the management or operational affairs of a
facility, and not merely if they have the capacity to influence, or the
unexercised right to control, facilities operations. 152 In subsequent
cases, such as Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence,153 courts have held
that the "terms 'owner' and 'operator' do not have any special
meaning under CERCLA, but are to be given their 'ordinary mean-
ings."'1 54 This understanding negates the Fleet Factors management
theory. Additionally, differing from the Mirabile holding, it also
recognizes a different dynamic usually identified through lender's
ownership of the contaminated property, where the bifurcation
between "obtaining," but not "retaining" the property for further
economic developments suggests that the lender would qualify for
secured creditor exemption.155 As long as a lender "holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect" its security interest in the property, it
is expected that its efforts to divest the property are taken at the
"earliest, practicable, commercially reasonable time." 156
Notwithstanding the presumption of non-liability for
lenders, 157 creditors have the burden of establishing their entitlement
to CERCLA's exemption. 58 However, "[d]espite the safe harbor
exemption, lenders still face potential liability in foreclosure
situations. Activities such as hiring guards to protect abandoned
property... may generate liability as an operator." 159
Comparing U.S. and Brazil's lender environmental liability
scheme, it is evident that the American scope is substantially
narrower than the Brazilian one. The U.S. model, however, does not
eliminate environmental concerns. Instead, it brings lender's
exposure in line with other risks, making their liability limited and
152 FABER ET AL., supra note 15, at 926.
153 212 F.3d 1219 (11 th Cir. 2000).
154 I. at 1222.
155 Id. at 1223-24.
156 Liu, supra note 134, at 599 (quoting Olaf de Senerpont Domis, New Law Finally
Limits Environmental Liability, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 1996, at 3).
157 See Liu, supra note 134, at 599.
158 Monarch Tile, 212 F.3d at 1222.
159 A. BARRY CAPPELLO, LENDER LIABILITY 325 (2009).
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predictable, not open-ended. 160 As long as lenders are treated like
lenders-and not owners-when applying sound banking practices,
this model seeks to avoid lenders' reluctance to grant financial
support or loans, which would be important resources to fund, for
example, cleanup actions. Additionally, the gradual development of
the U.S. threshold to lender liability occurred in a direction totally
opposite to that of the trend now observed in Brazil, where the public
administration, through the "Green Protocol," makes the boundaries
between the roles of government and financial institutions even more
ambiguous.
IV. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES
AND EQUATOR PRINCIPLES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
If not well addressed when doing business in Brazil, the
positive environmental commitments of Multilateral Development
Banks (MDB), Export Credit Agencies (ECA) and commercial banks
signatories of the Equator Principles (EPFI) can now result in
establishing lender liability under Brazil's domestic environmental
law, notwithstanding their care to refrain from actually participating
in the management or operation of the project.
Just like the rationale that inspired the U.S. lender liability,
MDBs, ECAs, and EPFIs are willing to protect their interests-
including reputational concerns -through the adoption of environ-
mental considerations in their lending procedures. Additionally,
MDBs have a broader development mandate, and EPFI's are inspired
by the emerging sustainability-driven business model. Nonetheless,
NGOs maintain that there is a "culture of loan approval," and that
environmental issues are being overlooked by some of these
lenders. 161
Successful campaigns of environmental groups on lending
policies have already triggered substantial changes in how the
160 Liu, supra note 134, at 600.
161 Lisa Friedman, South African Coal Plant Proposal Strains 'Culture' of World
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/04/05/05
climatewire-south-african-coal-plant-proposal-strains-cu-41781 html.
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world's largest development institutions proceed. 162 A domino effect
made these concerns reach ECAs and commercial banks.
Reacting to this advocacy network, in 1989 the United States
Congress adopted the so-called Pelosi Amendment, signed into law
by President George H. W. Bush.163 The amendment provides that
U.S. representatives of each multilateral development bank should
not approve projects with potentially significant environmental
impact without an analysis of the project's environmental and social
matters for at least four months, and that a comprehensive summary
be made available to affected groups and local NGOs.164
Other American agencies, namely the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC)165 and the Export-Import Bank of the
United States (Ex-Im),166 are also incontestably involved in the
development process.167 As U.S. federal agencies, they are subject to
the provisions of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),168 which requires the development of an environmental
162 NGO's complaints often arise from the promotion of unsustainable use of natural
resources and obstructions to local community participation. See Ian A. Bowles &
Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: the role of the US
Congress, 35 VA. J. INT'L L., 777 (1995).
163 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7 (2006).
164 Id. The 1989 version of the Pelosi Amendment also used to demand a
consultation with the Secretary of State and the administrators of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7 (1989) (amended 2004).
165 "OPIC helps U.S. businesses invest overseas, fosters economic development in
new and emerging markets, complements the private sector in managing risks
associated with foreign direct investment, and supports U.S. foreign policy."
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, http://www.opic.gov/about-us (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010).
166 "Ex-Im Bank's mission is to assist in financing the export of U.S. goods and
services to international markets . . . Ex-Im Bank provides working capital
guarantees (pre-export financing); export credit insurance; and loan guarantees and
direct loans (buyer financing)." EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.exim.gov/about (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
167 Although Ex-Im is the U.S. official ECA, OPIC carries similar features to those
of an export credit agency.
16' 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); See Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F.
Supp.2d 889 (2007).
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impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions significantly affecting
the human environment.169 As required by this statute, OPIC and Ex-
Im have articulated their procedures to implement NEPA. These
articulations are found in, respectively, the OPIC Environmental
Handbook (OPIC Handbook) and Ex-Im's Environmental Procedures
and Guidelines (Ex-Im Guidelines). 170 Both policies contemplate an
environmental screening process as a necessary condition for funding
access in case of project finance and long-term loans and guarantees.
The growing visibility of environmental issues within MDBs
combined with the advantages of joining in a "B Loan" Syndication
has reached lending operations of commercial banks. Lending
practices of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private
sector lending arm of the World Bank Group, illustrate this point. IFC
provides loan and equity capital for projects that fulfill its mission "to
promote sustainable private sector investment in developing
countries, helping to reduce poverty and improve people's lives." 171
In order to also improve capacity of financial markets in developing
countries,172 domestic financial institutions are encouraged to be part
of deals supported by IFC. However, these bank syndications are not
exclusive to financial institutions from the host country. As a result,
"IFC is never the sole investor in a project and always makes sure of
169 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
170 For example, in case of climate change impacts, projects developed in other
countries should be subjected to NEPA because of their effects in the U.S.
environment. "Ex-Im and OPIC [Defendants] argue that this Court must grant
judgment in their favor because Plaintiffs improperly seek to apply NEPA to projects
that are located in foreign countries. Plaintiffs, however, make clear that they seek to
apply NEPA because the projects that Defendants support purportedly significantly
affect the domestic environment. . . . [N]otwithstanding Defendants' arguments
regarding foreign policy relations, there is evidence to suggest that the Defendants
may have control over the manner in which these projects operate .... The Court
DENIES Defendants' motions to the extent they are premised on the
extraterritoriality argument." Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 908-909.
171 JFC Mission Statement, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, http://www.ifc.
org/ifcext/about.nsf/7afae2a79a656e70ca25692100069831 /d0e9906f064f418185256
d03006fcfaa?OpenDocument (last visited Jul. 5, 2010).
172 See Atiyah Curmally et al., World Resources Institute, Multilateral Development
Bank Lending Through Financial Intermediaries: Environmental and Social
Challenges 5 (June 2005), available at http://pdf.wri.org/iffe mdb_ lending.pdf.
V. is
Brazil's Lender Environmental Liability
other private investors' participation." 173 The combination of A and B
Loans is the most common way for IFC to participate in a project.174
For example, "[w]hen an IFC loan includes financing from the market
through the B Loan, IFC retains a portion of the loan for its own
account (the "A Loan"), and sells participations in the remaining
portion to participants (the "B Loan")." Among other advantages, a
commercial bank can gain from "B Loans" because this structure
results in benefits, such as the exemption from withholding taxes and
the introduction of new banking relationships. 175 Furthermore, since
the involvement of IFC in a project works like an approval seal for
the deal, it makes other potential investors interested in the project.
IFC has historically been a major source of funding for Brazil.
For example, in 2002, Brazil was the largest recipient of IFC financing,
not only in Latin America but also globally.176 However, IFC is not
the only crucial MDB player in the country1 77 The Inter-American
Development Bank Group (IDB Group), 178 the oldest and largest
regional multilateral development bank, 179 also holds a significant
173 See Sahar Sotoodehnia, Project Financing: the Role of International Finance
Corporation 5 (2010) (on file with author). "For this reason, IFC's amount of
investment cannot be more than 15 to 25% of the equity capital of the company and
IFC usually limits its A-Loans to 2 5% of the total estimated project costs in a
project, or 35% in small projects." Additionally, "[i]n the case of expansion projects,
IFC may provide up to 50% of the project costs, on the condition that its investments
do not exceed 25% of the total capitalization of the project company." Id
174 id.
175 
.id. at 1.
176 Press Release, International Finance Corporation, IFC Supports Major Footwear
Producer in Brazil with $30 Million (Nov. 12, 2002), available at http://www.ifc.
org/ifcext/pressroomlifcpressroom.nsf/PressRelease?openform& 12396FC5BF 7B IF
B185256C710075AE46 (last visited, Mar. 14, 2010).
177 As of June 2009, IFC has $6,951,978.9 million in cumulative gross commitments
to enterprises in Brazil. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, IFC ANNUAL
REPORT 2009, at 104 (2009), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/ annualreport.
nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AR2009 Volume2/$FILE/AR2009 Volume2.pdf.
178 The IDB Group is composed of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), and the Multilateral Investment Fund
(MIF).
179 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 4
(2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/ar/2009/docs/ENG AR FINAL.pdf.
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active portfolio which, from 1961 to 2009, reached $108 billion in
cumulative lending disbursements for projects hosted by Brazil,
positioning Brazil as IDB Group's largest shareholder. 180 Like the IFC,
the IDB Group's financing also includes commercial banks as key
instruments in the achievement of its development goals.
Because these commercial banks work with credit lines
provided by MDBs, they are requested to consider the same social
and environmental standards applied by the institution that is the
source of the funding.
However, the involvement of commercial banks with envi-
ronmental issues has gone beyond "B Loan" requirements. It
occurred not only in response to constant environmental demands of
NGOs, but also because of inherent environmental risks that become
credit risks, investor demands and corporate social responsibility
commitments.1 81 Leading commercial banks have concluded that an
advance environmental assessment and a subsequent monitoring
program could avoid significant losses.
As a result, in 2003, the Equator Principles -"a set of guide-
lines developed by the banks for managing social and environmental
issues related to the financing of development projects" - were
launched by ten leading commercial banks.1 82 In 2006, a revised
version of the "Principles" was announced based upon the social and
environmental guidelines developed by the IFC and the World Bank.
180 In the same period, Argentina and Mexico have, respectively, received $54 and
$57 billions. Id. at 45.
181 "The leaders have moved from the fear of reputation, to effective integrated risk
management, to a proactive strategy that captures value by seeking out well
performing companies, to competing on how one financial institution can invest in
the best company because it understands their risks as well as their opportunities
better than any other institution." Rachel Kyte, Balancing Rights with Respon-
sibilities: Looking for the Global Drivers of fateriality in Corporate Social
Responsibility & the Voluntary Initiatives that Develop and Support Them, 23 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 565 (2008).
182 The ten pioneer banks in the Equator Principles' Network "are ABN AMRO
Bank, Barclays plc, Citigroup, Inc., Credit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston,
HVB Group, Rabobank Group, The Royal Bank of Scotland, WestLB AG, and
Westpac Banking Corporation." Leading Banks Announce Adoption of Equator
Principles, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (June 4, 2003), http://www.equator-
principles.com/pr030604.shtml.
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The "Principles" have been estimated to be applied voluntarily to
'cover nearly 90 percent of global, cross-border project finance." 183 In
June 2010, almost 70 leading financial institutions have committed to
apply them.184
Under a superficial analysis, MDBs, ECAs and EPFIs appear
more exposed to lender environmental liability under Brazilian law.
Upon more thorough examination, they are better prepared to deal
with the upcoming challenges, mainly because their environmental
practices usually follow a regular lending cycle, organized in three
stages: due diligence, loan negotiation and documentation, and port-
folio management.18 5 Hence, especially when operating in Brazil,
these institutions are well-advised to fully and diligently apply their
policies on environmental considerations.
How their environmental practices are reflected in the loan
documentation is now decisive to protect their lending in Brazil. The
terms of contracts are the best source to indicate whether their
practices exacerbate or minimize the risks of environmental liability.
Given the position of Brazil's Superior Court of Justice that "aware-
ness"186 of the environmental harm triggers bank liability,187 a
financial institution lending in Brazil has a vital interest to design
contractual provisions that afford it effective tools to guarantee the
flow of information and feasible mechanisms to suspend disburse-
ments, or even, in very extreme cases, withdraw from the deal. If
183 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, AN INTEGRATED REPORT 20 (2007),
available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/annualreport.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AR2007
English/$FILE/AR2007 English.pdf.
184 See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited
June 11,2010).
185 Motoko Aizawa, The Equator Principles in Action: Creating a Community of
Learning, 42 INFRASTRUCTURE JOURNAL 10, 11 (2007).
186 In addition, the element "awareness" is being substantially explored by powerful
NGOs which jointly formed a global network that spread information about how
financial institutions are operating in controversial deals, especially in developing
countries, such as Brazil. See BankTrack HOME PAGE, www.banktrack.org (last
visited Apr. 19, 2010).
18 S.T.J.-T2, REsp 650728, Relator: Min. Benjamin Herman, 23.10.2007, R.S.T.J.,
02.12.2009 (Braz.).
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these mechanisms are not well developed, the lender may try to
avoid an environmental liability, but risk being sued for breach of
contract.
Although the most suitable contractual clauses should be
designed on a case by case basis and as a result of advance environ-
mental analysis, lenders should strongly consider the inclusion of
environmental concerns at least in key components of a loan
agreement, namely the definitions section, representation and war-
ranties,188 conditions precedent,189 covenants1 90  and events of
default. 191
Notwithstanding constant critiques presented by NGOs,
usually MDBs, ECAs and leading EPFls are better equipped than
other lenders that have not yet internalized environmental practices
188 "Representation and Warranties a series of statements of fact made by one party
on the basis of which the other party undertakes to enter into the agreement. The
representations will typically cover such matters as the legality and enforceability of
documentation, the compliance with relevant environmental and social laws, the
financial condition of the Borrower, and the absence of any material litigation or
other proceedings against the Borrower. Material inaccuracies in Borrower
representations will normally constitute an Event of Default under the loan
agreement." Guidance to EPFs on Incorporating Environmental and Social
Considerations into Loan Documentation, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (2009),
http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/EPLoanDocumentGuidance.pdf.
189 "Conditions Precedent-a set of pre-conditions that must be satisfied before the
borrower can request drawdown, or before other credit facilities can be made
available under a loan agreement. Conditions Precedent can be used to require
borrowers to make certain progress on environmental and social issues before
disbursement." Id.
190 "Covenants-the promises made by the Borrower to undertake certain actions
(positive covenant) or to refrain from taking certain actions (negative covenant).
Compliance with environmental and social laws and regulations, and the project's
Environmental and Social Action Plan, is a key covenant of project finance
agreements. Reporting requirements should also be included as a covenant. Material
non compliances with the covenants will normally constitute an Event of Default
under the loan agreement." Id.
191 "Event of Default-an event that entitles the Lenders to cancel a commitment,
declare all amounts owed by the Borrower to become immediately due and payable,
and/or enforce security. For projects with complex environmental or social issues,
the Lenders and Borrower may want to include specific environmental or social
Events of Default that may for instance refer to specific remedy periods." Id.
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in a manner that can affect the entire lending cycle. First, they can
better identify scenarios in which it is preferable to refuse to grant the
loan due to environmental problems. Second, their analysts are better
prepared to measure the risks of controversial deals and consider
these critical issues in negotiations with the borrower. Third,
investment agreements will probably reflect this diligence and pro-
vide safeguard mechanisms in case the lender is called to assume
environmental damages. Especially in long-term deals, the terms of
the contract can make a huge difference in courts.
For that reason, when doing business in Brazil, lenders which
are not yet prepared to effectively relate environmental concerns with
their analyses and investment documentation are encouraged to be
associated with MDBs, ECAs and leading EPFIs. Banking syndica-
tions are the best alternative in the short-term. Indeed, commercial
banks which have leading environmental practices are not only the
most proper players to act as leaders of bank syndications but may
also increase their leadership fees. However, it does not mean that co-
lenders should expect that the internal environmental due diligence
should be shared between creditors. Like other credit analysis, each
financial institution protects its own expertise, especially when
applied in an actual case.
Additionally, the desired "seal of approval" that involvement
of some institutions, particularly MDBs, may place on a project
should be balanced with the fact that some arrangements between
MDBs and financial intermediaries, such as in cases where funds are
disbursed directly into financial intermediaries balance sheets, may
not have the same environmental effects as direct lending (e.g. in the
A and B loan structure). In these indirect deals, 192 where the actual
beneficiaries are usually not identified when the financial inter-
mediary's project is evaluated, MDBs cannot conduct as detailed an
environmental assessment as they do with direct operations. As a
192 According to a 2005 study conducted by the think tank World Resources institute
(WRI) on MDB's practices, there are six common products for indirect lending:
bank loan (credit line); trade finance facility; equity investment in a private equity
fund; equity investment in a local bank; donor-supported investment facility; and
leasing facility. Curmally, supra note 172, at 4.
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result, the responsibility to undertake an environmental analysis is in
the financial intermediary's hands.1 93 However, notwithstanding the
supervision of the MDB, 9 4 a financial intermediary's capacity to
conduct environmental due diligence and associate it to the entire
lending cycle may vary substantially. In contrast, this delegation of
environmental analysis and monitoring process to financial inter-
mediaries may undermine the effects of a full application of MDB's
environmental standards, particularly because "MDB's baseline
performance standards is that [financial intermediaries'] subprojects
must follow the host country's regulations, despite the risk of
overrelying on these regulations in regard to implementation and
enforcement." 195
V. CONCLUSION
The emerging doctrine on strict, joint and several environ-
mental lender liability, combined with broad standing that welcomes
not only the Public Ministry, but also non-governmental organi-
zations, is alarming to lenders that operate in Brazil. The emerging
doctrine portrays lenders as the best target to pursue environmental
goals in the country. Due to chronic problems in the bureaucracy of
the public administration, the Brazilian government marches in the
opposite direction of U.S. leaders. Through the "Green Protocol," the
government seeks to deepen banking involvement in environmental
issues, which may represent a serious detour from the imperative of
improving the functionality of the public administration. As a result,
although lenders and legal actors, such as the Public Ministry and
NGOs, and particularly lenders with a broader development
mandate, are significant contributors towards sustainable develop-
ment, their substitution for the public administration likely does not
achieve the necessary environmental protection in the long-run.
"9 ld. at 5-6.
194 "[W]ith the exception of the MDB's monitoring of certain category A [the most
risky] subprojects, an annual report from the F1 project sponsor to the MDB is often
the only check with regard to the subprojects' compliance with the MDB's
environmental and social standards over the life of an Fl project." Id. at 7.
195 id. at 8.
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Even though secured creditors in the U.S. have also faced a
similar situation upon the initial adoption of CERCLA, developments
supported by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency led to a
safer scenario. The American doctrine on lender liability was tailored
to sound banking practices. Today, it is clear that a lender's routine
actions to limit its exposure to losses resulting from a borrowers'
failure to maintain sound environmental practices have a low risk of
resulting in lender liability.
Brazil now faces the risk of suffering a significant downturn
in the global competition for investment capital. However, practices
of MDBs, ECAs and leading EPFls, if fully and diligently applied, can
protect banks from environmental liability. A lender not yet prepared
to internalize environmental concerns throughout its lending cycle
can benefit from banking syndication with an institution capable of
dealing with these risks. Strong credit analysis and appropriate loan
documentation are even more crucial in upcoming deals in Brazil.

